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ABSTRACT 
 
This study examines the impact of corporate site visits on analysts’ forecast accuracy based on a 
sample of such visits to Chinese listed firms during 2009–2012. We find that analysts who 
conduct visits (“visiting analysts”) have a greater increase in forecast accuracy than other 
analysts. Consistent with the notion that site visits facilitate analysts’ information acquisition 
through observing firms’ operations, we find that the results are stronger for manufacturing firms, 
firms with more tangible assets, and firms with more concentrated business lines. Moreover, we 
find that the effect of a site visit is greater when the site visit is an analyst-only visit, when the 
current visit is preceded by fewer visits, and when visiting analysts are based far from the visited 
firms. Furthermore, we find that site visits partially mitigate nonlocal analysts’ information 
disadvantage. Collectively, these results indicate that site visits are an important information 
acquisition activity for analysts.  
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1 Introduction 
The usefulness of analyst research arises from analysts’ skill in processing public 
information and their information acquisition (e.g., Healy and Palepu 2001; Ivkovic and 
Jegadeesh 2004; Asquith, Mikhail, and Au 2005). Prior research examines how analysts use 
financial statement information to generate earnings forecasts and whether they are efficient in 
doing so (Bradshaw 2011). Although this research infers that analysts rely on their information 
acquisition (e.g., Chen, Cheng, and Lo 2010), direct evidence is limited. Bradshaw (2011) and 
Brown, Call, Clement, and Sharp (2015) call for research to better understand analysts’ 
information acquisition activities. The primary hurdle has been the lack of data on such activities, 
which are largely private (Soltes 2014). This study fills the void by investigating whether 
financial analysts obtain information to improve the accuracy of their earnings forecasts through 
a specific type of information acquisition activity: corporate site visits. 
The prevalence and importance of site visits are evident from the surveys conducted in both 
the U.S. (Brown et al. 2015) and Europe (the 2012 All-Europe Research Team Survey). However, 
in the U.S. and Europe, firms either do not maintain archival records of site visits or prohibit the 
distribution of such information. This study exploits the recent regulation of the mandatory 
disclosure of site visits in China. The Shenzhen Stock Exchange (SZSE) requires listed firms to 
disclose the information related to investors’ site visits in their annual reports starting from 2009. 
This disclosure requirement provides a unique setting for testing how analysts benefit from their 
corporate site visits. The Chinese setting has another advantage. Listed firms in emerging 
markets such as China operate in an opaque information environment (Morck, Yeung, and Yu 
2000). Site visits are thus expected to be a relatively more important information source, 
complementing public disclosures, compared with well-developed markets. Therefore examining 
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site visits in China increases the power of the tests in determining the effect of analysts’ site 
visits on their forecast performance. 
Based on prior research and in-depth interviews with investor relations (IR) managers, sell-
side analysts, and fund managers, we expect that analysts can improve their earnings forecast 
accuracy through site visits. In a typical visit, the analysts engage in face-to-face talks with IR 
managers and divisional managers and then tour the firm’s operating and production activities.1 
The face-to-face talks can help analysts to gain additional details about and insights into a firm’s 
performance. Observing a firm’s operations and its factories and business units allows an analyst 
to better understand its production process, corporate culture, and employee morale, potentially 
leading to more accurate forecasts.  
However, the information obtained from site visits might not be material enough to affect 
analysts’ forecasts of current year’s earnings. Indeed, based on the data of 75 private interactions 
between analysts and top executives of one large U.S. firm, Soltes (2014) finds no evidence that 
analysts’ forecast accuracy improves after these private interactions. Thus it is an empirical 
question whether analysts can improve their forecast accuracy through corporate site visits. 
We adopt a difference-in-differences research design to evaluate the effect of site visits on 
forecast accuracy. We calculate the forecast accuracy changes around site visits and then 
compare the changes between visiting and nonvisiting analysts. Our sample consists of 6,651 site 
visits to 931 unique firms during 2009–2012. Consistent with our hypothesis, we find that 
visiting analysts experience an improvement in forecast accuracy after site visits compared to 
nonvisiting analysts. Using alternative approaches to demonstrate the usefulness of site visits, we 
                                                 
1 According to the corporate site visit policies disclosed by listed firms, IR managers, including board secretaries 
and securities affairs representatives, are usually the liaisons for site visits. They are responsible for approving site 
visit applications, organizing field tours, and accompanying the visitors during the site visits. Our interviews suggest 
that the practice is consistent with these corporate policies.  
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find that the market reaction is greater for the forecast revisions issued by visiting analysts than 
those by nonvisiting analysts.  
One salient feature of site visits is that analysts can observe a firm’s operations and 
facilities. In contrast, analysts’ other information acquisition activities, such as hosting investor 
conferences and participating in conference calls, mainly entail interacting with top executives 
(Mayew, Sharp, and Venkatachalam 2013; Green, Jame, Markov, and Subasi 2014a). Consistent 
with the importance of observing firms’ operations, we document a greater effect of site visits to 
firms in the manufacturing industries, to firms with higher asset tangibility, and to firms with 
more concentrated business lines. These results highlight the notion that the information 
channels in site visits differ from those in investor conferences, which are shown to be more 
useful for firms with more intangible assets (Green et al. 2014a).  
We next explore the richness of the site visit data, particularly the disclosure of visitors’ 
names. We find that the effect of site visits on analyst forecast accuracy is more pronounced for 
the site visits conducted by sell-side analysts only than those conducted jointly by sell-side 
analysts and buy-side investors. This finding suggests that analyst-only visits are more likely to 
entail information acquisition, while analysts’ site visits with buy-side investors are, to some 
extent, client service activities, as suggested by Soltes (2014). Moreover, we find that the effect 
of site visits is more pronounced for visits with fewer preceding visits and for those conducted by 
analysts based far from the visited firms, where the visiting analysts are less informed before the 
visits.  
Unlike other types of analysts’ activities, analysts are less likely to interact with top 
executives during site visits. As shown in Cheng, Du, Wang, and Wang (2015), a firm’s top 
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executives participate in only 15.2% of the site visits.2 Moreover, if site visits merely reflect 
visiting analysts’ close relationship with top managers, the effect would be stronger for analysts 
based near the firm, assuming that the geographic proximity facilitates the establishment of 
private relationship with top executives.3 However, we find that nonlocal analysts benefit more 
from site visits than local ones. Furthermore, one might argue that the analysts who have better 
access to management are more likely to conduct site visits and issue more accurate forecasts. 
However, in one of our additional analyses, we exclude analysts who issued strong buy 
recommendations or had investment banking relationships with the visited firm. Our inferences 
remain the same. We also conduct a series of analyses and find that our results are unlikely to be 
driven by managers’ selective disclosure during site visits. 
Another alternative explanation for our results is that capable, well-informed analysts 
choose to conduct site visits and they also issue more accurate forecasts. We do not believe that 
this alternative argument can explain our results because the difference-in-differences research 
design, to a large extent, controls for the potential self-selection issue. Nevertheless, we perform 
two additional analyses to further address this issue. First, we find that visiting and nonvisiting 
analysts have similar forecast accuracy in the pre-visit period, inconsistent with the notion that 
visiting analysts are more skilled or better informed. Second, for every site visit to a firm, we 
restrict the nonvisiting benchmark group to the analysts who have visited this firm at other times. 
The inferences remain the same. It is, however, possible that analysts’ time-varying access to the 
information and their additional research in preparation for site visits, at least partly, drive the 
                                                 
2 Cheng et al. (2015) hand-collect the information about firm executives’ participation in site visits from the detailed 
records of 4,425 site visits from the SZSE website in 2013. Please note that firms started to provide the detailed 
minutes of site visits only in 2013, including whom the visitors met with during the visits. This information is not 
available during our sample period. 
3 Prior studies (e.g., Bae, Stulz, and Tan 2008) provide evidence consistent with the argument that analysts are more 
likely to have access to top executives of the firms located in the same area.  
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results.  
We use two alternative research designs to examine the improvement in analysts’ forecast 
accuracy after site visits. First, we compare the relative accuracy of forecasts issued by an 
analyst for firms she visits and for firms she does not visit in the same year. Second, we compare 
the relative accuracy of the forecasts issued for the same firm by an analyst between the years 
when she conducts site visits and the years when she does not. For both tests, we hold analyst 
characteristics constant, and, in the second test, we further hold firm characteristics constant. We 
find that earnings forecasts after site visits are more accurate than other earnings forecasts issues 
by the same analysts. These results mitigate the concern that our results are driven by omitted 
analyst or firm characteristics.  
We then link our analyses to the literature on geographic advantage by investigating 
whether nonlocal analysts can overcome their information disadvantage through site visits. We 
first confirm that, on average, local analysts have higher forecast accuracy than nonlocal analysts. 
However, the forecasts issued by nonlocal analysts who conduct one site visit are as accurate as 
those issued by local analysts who do not conduct any site visits. If nonlocal analysts visit a firm 
twice or more, their forecasts are more accurate than those issued by nonvisiting local analysts. 
Lastly, because not all analysts conduct site visits, we conduct a determinant analysis to 
investigate which factors affect analysts’ site visit decisions. We find that analysts are less likely 
to visit firms that are far away but are more likely to visit those with more tangible assets and 
more concentrated business lines. Analysts from larger brokerages are more likely to conduct site 
visits than other analysts. These results indicate that the likelihood of analysts’ visits increases 
with the expected benefits and decreases with the costs of conducting site visits. 
Our study contributes to financial analyst research by enhancing our understanding of 
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analysts’ information discovery role and providing direct evidence on the link between analysts’ 
information acquisition and their forecast performance. A large body of literature explores the 
factors associated with better forecast performance, including industry specialization, firm-
specific experience, geographic proximity, and educational ties.4 These studies focus more on 
analysts’ attributes—who they are, and less on what they do (Bradshaw 2011). Analyst 
information acquisition is confidential, and the challenge of directly observing and measuring the 
effects has hindered researchers’ ability to understand its role in analysts’ forecast performance. 
We circumvent this issue by relying on a new regulation in China that requires firms to disclose 
information on analyst site visits. 
Our study extends an emerging literature that directly examines analysts’ activities. For 
example, Mayew et al. (2013) focus on analysts who ask questions during conference calls and 
conclude that they have superior private information before conference calls. Green et al. (2014a, 
2014b) focus on analysts hosting investor conferences and conclude that they have superior 
access to management. Using private data from one NYSE-listed company, Soltes (2014) 
examines analysts’ private interactions with managers (largely through phone calls) and finds 
that analysts’ forecast accuracy does not improve afterward. Compared with these activities, site 
visits represent analysts’ proactive information acquisition and involve analysts observing firms’ 
operation and assets, rather than relying only on discussions with top executives. We show that 
site visits have a greater effect for firms whose operations can be better understood through on-
site observations. Moreover, thanks to the richness of the data, we can explore how the 
usefulness of site visits varies with their characteristics and those of the visited firms. This 
variation helps explain why the effect of site visits to one firm, as documented in Soltes (2014), 
                                                 
4 Please see Jacob, Lys, and Neale (1999); Mikhail, Walther, and Willis (1997); Malloy (2005); and Cohen, Frazzini, 
and Malloy (2010) for examples. 
7 
 
might not be generalizable to others. Our in-depth field interviews also contribute to our 
understanding of the complex process of analysts’ corporate site visits. 
Our study also contributes to the literature on local information advantage. Malloy (2005) 
and later studies (e.g., Bae et al. 2008) show that local analysts issue more accurate forecasts 
than remote analysts. Our results indicate that site visits help nonlocal analysts to mitigate their 
information disadvantage to some extent. 
Findings from China are important in their own right, given the country’s increasingly 
important role in the world economy and the rapid development of its financial service industry. 
Our results should provide suggestive evidence on the role of site visits in the U.S. capital 
markets. Anecdotes of investors’ site visits abound in the U.S., especially in the post-Regulation 
FD period, during which selective disclosure has been banned and investors must obtain 
information by other means (Call, Chen, and Tong 2013; Soltes 2014).5 However, we 
acknowledge the possibility that the institutional differences between China and the U.S. might 
limit the generalizability of our findings.6  
The remainder of this paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 reviews the related literature 
and develops hypotheses. Section 3 describes the sample and research design. Section 4 reports 
the main analyses, and Section 5 presents the additional analyses. Section 6 concludes. 
 
2 Prior literature, institutional background, and hypothesis development 
2.1 Analysts’ information acquisition and forecast performance 
                                                 
5 Prior research also examines other types of selective access events, such as investors’ private meetings with firm 
executives (Solomon and Soltes 2015). 
6 We would like to point out that China has adopted the U.S. version of Regulation FD by mandating that, if an 
issuer discloses material nonpublic information to certain persons, it must make public disclosure of that information. 
According to the Article 41 of the CSRC’s Regulation FD, which took effect on Jan. 31, 2007, “A listed company 
shall, hold conference calls, analysts’ meetings, road shows, accepting investors’ field investigation, etc., to 
communicate with the institutions and individuals about the business operations, financial status and other events, 
but it shall not provide any inside information.”  
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Analysts are important capital market intermediaries who help decrease the information 
asymmetry between managers and outside investors (e.g., O’Brien and Bhushan 1990). Their 
superior forecast performance generally arises from their active information acquisition and 
superior information processing skills. Prior studies examine how analysts’ forecast performance 
varies with industry specialization (Jacob et al. 1999), firm-specific experience (Mikhail et al. 
1997), and brokerage size (Clement 1999; Jacob et al. 1999), among other factors. However, it is 
not well understood how analysts’ information acquisition influences their forecast performance. 
Recent studies find that analysts who ask questions during conference calls (Mayew et al. 2013) 
or host investor conferences (Green et al. 2014a, 2014b) have superior information. However, it 
is unclear whether their superior performance is driven by the activities per se or by self-
selection, as more skilled or better-connected analysts may be more likely to ask questions and 
host conferences.  
In determining the direct effect of an information acquisition activity, ideally the activity 
should help the analysts who participate but not others. This is not the case for investor 
conferences or conference calls, as nonhosting analysts can also attend investor conferences and 
silent analysts can also listen to conference calls. In contrast, corporate site visits exclusively 
benefit the visiting analysts. Nonvisiting analysts have no direct access to the information 
obtained during visits. Therefore one can compare visiting and nonvisiting analysts’ forecast 
accuracy to determine the direct effect of site visits. 
2.2 Corporate site visits and visiting analysts’ information advantage 
2.2.1 Institutional background and the main hypothesis 
Site visits refer to the visits investors pay to firms in order to talk to managers and other 
employees and to observe the firms’ production activities and operation facilities. To understand 
how, when, and why analysts conduct site visits, we study the related regulations, corporate 
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policies, and corporate disclosures on site visits. We also conduct in-depth interviews with three 
IR managers, three sell-side analysts, and three fund managers.7 We include some of the quotes 
below where appropriate. We use the insights gained from these materials and field interviews to 
enrich our understanding of the institutional background, to substantiate our hypothesis 
development, and to interpret our empirical results in a broader context.  
Site visits are not restricted to a few favored market participants according to the 
“Guidelines of Investor Relations Management” (referred to as “guidelines” hereafter). In Article 
41 of the Guidelines, the SZSE states that “Listed companies should try to accommodate the 
request from investors, analysts, and fund managers to visit company headquarters and project 
sites to the greatest extent.” In the guidelines, the SZSE emphasizes that “Listed companies 
should arrange the site visits properly, so that visitors may better understand the companies’ 
business and operational situations.” According to our interviewees, firms usually do not reject 
site visit requests unless the requested visit occurs during a blackout or sensitive period (e.g., 
before major announcements). Whether analysts can visit firms on their preferred dates depends 
on negotiations between the firm and the analysts. For example, one interviewed analyst noted 
that, “Companies usually do not say no to site visit requests, but whether you can have your 
preferred visit time depends on your relative status and long-term relationship with the company.” 
Most site visits are initiated by sell-side analysts. Analysts can go alone or with their buy-
side clients, depending on whether the visit is mainly for information acquisition or client service. 
A typical visit starts with a briefing and Q&A session, followed by a tour of the firm’s facilities. 
During the visits, analysts speak face-to-face with IR managers, other mid-level managers, or 
both and observe the operations. Here is how one interviewed IR manager and one interviewed 
                                                 
7 We follow a strict interview protocol, asking the same set of open-ended questions in the same order across all 
interviews. 
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analyst described the process.  
A typical site visit lasts for three to four hours—one to two hours of talk, followed by a 
two-hour visit to our real-estate development site.  
 
Companies are very flexible in accommodating our interview requests. For example, if we 
have a really good discussion session in the morning, and ask to visit the production 
assembly lines in the afternoon, companies do not reject such a request. 
 
These interactions help analysts to triangulate their model parameters, obtain more detailed 
and contextual information about public announcements, and better understand the firm’s 
strategy and positioning. The interviewed analysts confirmed that site visits could help them 
obtain both earnings- and non-earnings-related information, such as the strategic positioning of a 
business unit, the product, and other soft information (e.g., the firm’s relationship with the local 
government and banks). For example, one interviewed analyst described the information 
obtained from corporate site visits as follows. 
Most of the discussions focus on two parts: the operational situation and future prospects. 
For the current operational situation, analysts usually ask about the production, sales, 
pricing, market competition, and future expected changes in prices and margins. This is 
relevant to our financial modeling forecasts. We can adjust the model parameters based 
on the information obtained from the site visit. For the future prospects, we want to hear 
about the management team’s strategic planning and their positioning of a certain 
business sector and product line.  
 
In summary, these discussions suggest that analysts can improve their forecast accuracy 
through site visits.8 Our first hypothesis is thus stated as follows (in alternative form): 
H1: Ceteris paribus, the forecast accuracy of visiting analysts improves after corporate site 
visits. 
 
However, the information obtained from site visits may not be material enough to affect 
                                                 
8 We focus on forecast accuracy because it is the most frequently studied performance metric of analysts in the 
accounting literature. The information obtained from site visits likely affects forecast accuracy more than other 
performance metrics, such as recommendation profitability. Analysts also have incentives to improve their forecast 
accuracy. In China, analysts’ compensation is largely determined by their annual rankings, as determined by some 
media such as New Fortune and Today Investment. While New Fortune’s star analyst ranking is largely based on the 
votes of institutional investors, Today Investment’s ranking is more objective, and one of the awards is explicitly 
designated for the analysts with the most accurate earnings forecasts in every industry.  
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analysts’ forecasts of the current year’s earnings. Analysts may also rely too much on the 
information conveyed by IR managers or employees and not discover new information 
themselves. And if a firm intends to hide information, visiting analysts will obtain few 
informative cues. Moreover, visitors usually do not meet with top executives such as CEOs and 
CFOs during site visits.9 According to some studies (e.g., Bushee, Jung, and Miller 2013), top 
executives are usually the main sources of information; thus analysts might not be able to obtain 
useful information from corporate site visits. These discussions imply that whether visiting 
analysts’ forecast accuracy improves after site visits is an empirical question.  
2.2.2 Cross-sectional variation 
The effectiveness of site visits may vary with the expected benefits from observing a firm’s 
operations and facilities, the purpose of the visits, and the quality of the information environment 
faced by the visiting analysts before their visits.  
Unlike other analyst activities, site visits feature the opportunity to observe the production 
process, operating assets, assembly lines, and employee morale. We thus expect that the 
effectiveness of visits varies with the informativeness of these visual cues obtained from these 
observations. First, we predict that observations are more informative for manufacturing firms 
and firms with more tangible assets because these firms have more observable activities and 
assets. These predictions are also consistent with analysts’ beliefs. For example, one interviewed 
analyst noted: “We feel that the observation part of site visits is very important when we visit 
manufacturing firms or firms with more tangible assets.” 
Second, a site visit is more effective if the observations provide more insights into the 
firm’s overall performance. The more concentrated a firm’s business lines, the more the on-site 
operation represents its overall business and hence the more useful the site visits are for 
                                                 
9 As discussed in Cheng et al. (2015), a firm’s top executives participate in only 15.2% of the site visits. 
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forecasting the firm’s operating performance.  
The above discussions lead to the following hypothesis (in alternative form): 
H2: Ceteris paribus, the improvement in visiting analysts’ forecast accuracy, as stated in H1, is 
more pronounced for manufacturing firms, firms with more tangible assets, and firms with 
more concentrated business lines.  
 
Site visits may serve purposes other than information acquisition. As noted by one 
interviewed analyst: “It serves different purposes when analysts go by themselves versus when 
they invite their buy-side clients along with them. The former do so to look for information and 
potential opportunities, and the latter do so to provide buy-side services.” Prior research also 
indicates that, when sell-side analysts conduct site visits with buy-side investors, the primary 
purpose is to help buy-side clients to gain corporate access (Brown et al. 2015; Soltes 2014). 
Therefore we expect site visits to improve forecast accuracy more when conducted by sell-side 
analysts only. 
The effectiveness of site visits should also vary with the information environment faced by 
visitors before the visits. First, research finds that nonlocal analysts have a significant 
information disadvantage due to their lack of alternative informal channels and local contact 
(Malloy 2005; Bae et al. 2008). This is consistent with our field insights. One analyst, for 
example, said: “Although local analysts do visit local companies more often, they may have 
alternative private information channels and do not need to rely on site visits as much as nonlocal 
analysts.” We thus expect nonlocal analysts to improve more from conducting site visits than 
local analysts. Second, a site visit that is preceded by other investors’ site visits may be less 
informative, as visitors in the prior visits might have already conveyed the same information to 
the market. This argument is consistent with the belief of some analysts, as summarized by one 
of our interviewees. That analyst said: “If the information has already been revealed by a first 
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mover, the effect of a follow-up report is rather limited.” It thus follows that the visitors benefit 
more from their site visits if there are fewer site visits before theirs.  
This leads to our third hypothesis (in alternative form): 
H3: Ceteris paribus, the improvement in visiting analysts’ forecast accuracy, as stated in H1, is 
more pronounced for analyst-only site visits, for nonlocal analysts, and for site visits with 
fewer preceding visits. 
 
3 Sample and methodology 
3.1 Sample 
The data on analysts’ corporate site visits to firms listed on the Shenzhen Stock Exchange 
(SZSE) are available from 2009 onward. According to the SZSE Information Fair Disclosure 
Guidelines, effective from August 2006, firms listed on the SZSE must report to the China 
Securities Regulatory Committee (CSRC) two working days before site visits. The firm must 
submit a summary of the site visit to both the CSRC and SZSE after a visit is conducted. 
However, these reports are not available to the public. In 2008, the SZSE mandated that all listed 
firms disclose the summary information about every site visit in their annual reports starting 
from 2009.10 The disclosure of site visits is strictly enforced. The SZSE publicly denounces firms 
that fail to disclose site visit information.  
Appendix A provides an example of site visit records, showing that investors conduct site 
visits to a firm’s headquarters, operation facilities, and warehouses. The list of site visit records 
occasionally includes non-site-visit events, such as telephone interviews, webinars, email 
exchanges, nondeal road shows, investor conferences, industry summits and forums, and annual 
                                                 
10 Analysts likely have other non-official means to obtain information on their peers’ site visits. First, occasionally 
there are voluntary disclosures on some firms’ websites about visits. But it is unclear how timely or comprehensive 
such disclosures are. Second, based on the authors’ conversations with the analysts who have conducted site visits, 
some analysts may obtain such information through their networks (e.g., their friends in other brokerages covering 
the same industry) or through their peers’ research reports issued after site visits. 
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broker conferences. We exclude all non-site-visit events from our sample. An analyst on average 
conducts one visit per year to the firms she follows, although some analysts conduct more. For 
example, as shown in Appendix A, the analyst from GF Securities visited the firm on April 12, 
2011, and again on December 15.  
We hand-collect the site visit records from the annual reports of the SZSE-listed firms 
during 2009–2012. Our data include the event dates and the names of the visiting institutions. 
Table 1 presents the sample selection procedures. First, we only include the site visits involving 
at least one sell-side Chinese broker.11 We drop the site visits where there are no analyst earnings 
forecast data from the CSMAR database for the visited firms in the current year.12 Second, some 
site visits fall on adjacent dates, and we combine them as one site visit event to avoid 
misclassifying visiting analysts as nonvisiting analysts. Third, we require that at least one 
earnings forecast be issued by visiting analysts during the period from six months before the site 
visit to the end of the first month afterward. This requirement is necessary to test the change in 
an analyst’s forecast accuracy after a site visit. We impose the same requirement for the 
nonvisiting analysts. Lastly, we exclude financial firms or firms that have missing values for 
control variables in the regressions. 
The final sample includes 6,651 site visits to 931 unique firms between 2009 and 2012. Of 
these site visits, 526 occurred in 2009, 1,323 in 2010, 1,719 in 2011, and 3,083 in 2012. The 
increase in the number of visits is largely driven by the increase in the number of firms with site 
                                                 
11 We identify sell-side brokers in the following way. First, we assign one unique broker ID to each broker, even 
when they take different formats in different firms’ site visit records (e.g., “CITIC Securities,” “CITIC Securities 
Company,” and “CITIC Securities Co. Ltd.,”) or when they change names over the sample period. Second, we 
exclude the buy-side analysts’ visits based on a manual check of the brokers’ websites. This process leads to a total 
of 167 unique brokers, 114 of which are Chinese brokers and 53 of which are foreign brokers. Of the 114 Chinese 
brokers, 102 brokers’ forecasts are covered in the CSMAR database. 
12 We match the brokers’ names in the analyst forecast database with those in the site visit database. Because one 
broker usually has only one analyst covering a specific firm, we use “broker” and “analyst” interchangeably when 
discussing forecasts.  
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visits, from 159 in 2009 to 765 in 2012, which is consistent with the gradual increase in the 
number of listed firms in the SZSE. The number of visits per firm fluctuates over the sample 
period (3.31 in 2009, 4.41 in 2010, 4.21 in 2011, and 4.03 in 2012).  
In our final sample, the mean (median) number of site visits conducted by the same visiting 
analysts to the same firm in a single year is 1.29 (1.00). Relatedly, we find that 91% of the 
brokers (i.e., their analysts) covered in the CSMAR database visited at least one SZSE firm 
during the sample period.  
3.2 Research design  
To evaluate the effect of site visits, we use a difference-in-differences research design and 
compare the change in forecast accuracy between visiting and nonvisiting analysts. We rely on 
the visitors’ names to identify the visiting analysts—the analysts from the brokers whose names 
are listed for a particular site visit. We refer to the analysts who follow the same firms but whose 
brokers’ names are not associated with the site visits as nonvisiting analysts.13 While there is 
only one visiting analyst for most visits, for about 23% of the visits, there are multiple visiting 
analysts. In addition, for every site visit, there are many nonvisiting analysts, whose forecasts 
serve as the benchmark for those of visiting analysts. To increase the power of the test and avoid 
the inflation of statistical tests, the unit of analysis is analyst group by site visit. Specifically, we 
calculate forecast accuracy for each analyst group (visiting or nonvisiting) based on the group’s 
consensus forecast in the pre- (i.e., six months before the site visit) and post-visit period (i.e., one 
month after the site visit). The change in forecast accuracy for an analyst group controls for the 
effects of analyst-specific characteristics. The difference in the change in forecast accuracy 
between the visiting and nonvisiting analyst groups controls for the effects of potential 
                                                 
13 We also require that, for each site visit event, nonvisiting analysts do not conduct any other site visit to the same 
firm during the period beginning from six months before to the end of the first month afterward. This constraint is 
imposed to ensure a clean sample of nonvisiting analysts as the benchmark group for such a visit.  
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concurrent events or firm characteristics that might affect analysts’ performance. As such, the 
difference-in-differences approach captures the effects of corporate site visits on visiting analysts’ 
forecast accuracy.  
3.2.1 Regression model for H1  
We use the following regression to investigate the improvement in visiting analysts’ 
forecast accuracy:  
	߂ܣܿܿݑݎܽܿݕ௞,௝,௧ ൌ α ൅ ߚܸ݅ݏ݅ݐ௞,௝,௧ ൅ ߛଵ߂݄݋ݎ݅ݖ݋݊௞,௝,௧ ൅ ߛଶܨ݅ݎ݉݁ݔ݌௞,௝,௧ ൅ ߛଷܤݎ݋݇݁ݎݏ݅ݖ݁௞,௝,௧ 	
൅ ߛସܣܰܣ_݃ݎ݋ݑ݌௞,௝,௧ 	൅ ߛହܯ ௝ܸ,௧ ൅ ߛ଺ܰܫ_ݏݐ݀௝,௧ ൅ ߛ଻ܫ݊ݏݐ_݄݋݈݀݅݊݃௝,௧ ൅ ߛ଼ܫ݊݀݁݌௝,௧
൅ ߛଽܤܯ௝,௧ ൅ ߛଵ଴ܩݎ݋ݓݐ ௝݄,௧ ൅ ߛଵଵܮ݋ݏݏ௝,௧ ൅ ߛଵଶܤܪܣ ௝ܴ,௧ ൅ ܫ݊݀ݑݏݐݎݕ௝,௧
൅ ߝ௞,௝,௧,																																																																																																																																								ሺ1ሻ 
 
where ߂ܣܿܿݑݎܽܿݕ௞,௝,௧ ൌ െሺܲ݋ݏݐ_ܸ݅ݏ݅ݐ_ܣܨܧ௞,௝,௧ െ ܲݎ݁_ܸ݅ݏ݅ݐ_ܣܨܧ௞,௝,௧ሻ. This variable captures the 
change in forecast accuracy for analyst group k (visiting or nonvisiting analyst group) from the 
pre- to the post-visit period for the site visit occurring on day t for firm j; a positive value 
indicates an improvement in forecast accuracy. Because the unit of analysis is site visit-analyst 
group, we have two observations for each site visit, one for the visiting analyst group and the 
other for the nonvisiting analyst group. For each group, we calculate the forecast error 
(Pre_Visit_AFE) in the pre-visit period based on the mean of individual analysts’ most recent 
annual EPS forecasts (i.e., group consensus forecast) in the pre-visit period. Forecast error is 
calculated as the absolute value of the difference between the group consensus forecast and 
actual EPS, scaled by the stock price at the beginning of the year and expressed as a 
percentage.14 The forecast error in the post-visit period (Post_Visit_AFE) is calculated in the 
same fashion, based on the first forecast issued by each analyst in the group in the post-visit 
period. If a visiting (or nonvisiting) analyst does not update her forecast during the post-visit 
                                                 
14 In China, forecast errors, when scaled by stock prices, are usually very small. This is due to the very high PE ratio 
in Chinese stock markets. Our statistics are comparable to those reported in other studies of Chinese financial 
analysts, such as those of Gu, Li, and Yang (2013). In an untabulated additional analysis, we use the relative forecast 
accuracy score developed by Hong and Kubik (2003), and our inferences remain the same.  
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period, we assume the post-visit forecasts to be the same as the pre-visit forecast.15 The main 
variable of interest is the indicator variable for visiting analysts (Visitk,j,t). The coefficient on this 
variable captures the improvement in visiting analysts’ forecast accuracy relative to that of 
nonvisiting analysts. H1 implies that Visitk,j,t has a positive coefficient. 
Following prior studies, we control for other variables that affect analysts’ forecast 
accuracy. Forecasts issued closer to earnings announcements are more accurate than older 
forecasts (Clement 1999). Thus we control for the change in forecasting horizon (ΔHorizon), 
which is measured as the natural logarithm of the difference in the mean of the forecasting 
horizon (the number of days) of individual earnings forecasts for each analyst group from the 
pre- to post-visit periods. In addition, because more experienced analysts make more accurate 
earnings forecasts (Mikhail et al. 1997), we control for analysts’ firm-specific experience 
(Firmexp), which is measured as the natural logarithm of the average number of years the 
analysts have been following the firm. Prior literature shows that analysts’ forecast accuracy is 
affected by the size of their brokerages, with larger brokerages having more resources. Thus we 
control for brokerage size (Brokersize), which is measured as the number of unique financial 
analysts working for the brokerage during the year. As suggested by prior literature, the 
consensus forecast of a larger group of analysts is more accurate. Thus we control for group size 
(ANA_group), which is measured as the number of analysts in the group. We calculate the above 
variables separately for the visiting and nonvisiting analyst groups.  
Lastly, we control for the firm characteristics that can affect the analysts’ forecast accuracy, 
including institutional ownership (Inst_holding), board independence (Indep), firm size (MV), 
                                                 
15 The inferences remain the same when we exclude these analysts from the analyses. Separately, some analysts 
issue a post-visit forecast but not a pre-visit forecast. For these cases, we assume that the pre-visit forecast to be the 
same as the mean value of all other analysts’ pre-visit forecasts. The inferences remain the same if we exclude these 
analysts from the analyses. 
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book-to-market ratio (BM), buy-and-hold abnormal returns (BHAR), earnings volatility (NI_std), 
sales growth (Growth), and a loss firm indicator (Loss). Appendix B provides the definitions of 
these variables. We also include industry fixed effects in the regression model. The t-values are 
based on standard errors adjusted for firm- and year-level clustering.  
3.2.2 Regression models for H2 and H3 
To test H2, we expand Equation (1) by adding the interaction terms between the indicator 
for visiting analysts and the firm characteristics capturing the effectiveness of on-site observation: 
߂ܣܿܿݑݎܽܿݕ௞,௝,௧ ൌ α ൅ ߚଵܸ݅ݏ݅ݐ௞,௝,௧ ൅ ߚଶܨ݅ݎ݉_݄ܿܽݎ௝,௧ ൅ ߚଷܸ݅ݏ݅ݐ௞,௝,௧ ൈ ܨ݅ݎ݉_݄ܿܽݎ௝,௧ ൅ ࢽ࡯࢕࢔࢚࢘࢕࢒࢙ ൅
ߝ௞,௝,௧,		 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 ሺ2ሻ 
 
where Firm_char refers to one of the three indicator variables for manufacturing firms, firms 
with high asset tangibility, and firms with high business concentration, respectively. H2 implies 
that the coefficient on the interaction term is positive. 
H3 predicts that the effect of a site visit depends on whether it serves the purposes of buy-
side client service or information acquisition, whether the visiting analysts are nonlocal, and 
whether there are fewer previous visits. Note that these partitions are only relevant for the 
visiting analysts. Therefore, to test H3, we add to Equation (1) only the interaction term of Visit 
and the indicator for the partition without adding the standalone variables:16  
߂ܣܿܿݑݎܽܿݕ௞,௝,௧ ൌ α ൅ ߚଵܸ݅ݏ݅ݐ௞,௝,௧ ൅ ߚଶܸ݅ݏ݅ݐ௞,௝,௧ ൈ ܸ݅ݏ݅ݐ_݄ܿܽݎ௞,௝,௧ ൅ ࢽ	࡯࢕࢔࢚࢘࢕࢒࢙ ൅ ߝ௞,௝,௧,		 ሺ3ሻ	
where Visit_char is an indicator variable that equals one separately for visiting analyst 
observations when site visits involve sell-side analysts only, when site visits are dominated by 
nonlocal analysts, and when site visits are preceded by fewer site visits; it is equal to zero for 
                                                 
16 The objective of H3 is to test whether the usefulness of site visits varies with the characteristics of site visits or 
visiting analyst groups, which are not relevant for nonvisiting analysts. When we include the main effect of these 
variables in an untabulated analysis, the inferences remain the same. Also while we include the interaction terms 
separately in the regression, the results are quantitatively similar when we include all interaction terms in the same 
regression model (untabulated). 
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other visiting analyst observations and for all of the nonvisiting analyst observations. Appendix 
B provides detailed definitions of these indicator variables. H3 implies that the coefficient on the 
interaction term is positive. 
  
4 Empirical results 
4.1 Univariate tests 
Table 2 presents the descriptive statistics on forecast accuracy. As shown in the table, 
visiting and nonvisiting analysts have similar forecast accuracy in the pre-visit period. However, 
in the post-visit period, the visiting analysts have significantly lower forecast errors (1.077 vs. 
1.201 with p-value=0.01) and therefore higher forecast accuracy than the nonvisiting analysts. 
As a result, the visiting analysts experience a much more pronounced improvement in forecast 
accuracy (0.164 vs. 0.041 with p-value = 0.00), consistent with H1.  
Table 2 also reports the descriptive statistics on other variables for our main analyses. 
Recall that, for each site visit event, analyst-specific characteristics differ for the visiting and 
nonvisiting analyst groups but the firm-specific characteristics are the same. Therefore we 
present the descriptive statistics for the analyst-related variables separately for the two 
subsamples. We observe that visiting analysts have a smaller change in forecast horizon 
(ΔHorizon), have slightly more firm-specific experience on average, and are more likely to work 
for larger brokers than nonvisiting analysts. The average number of analysts is only 1.385 for the 
visiting analyst group but 7.234 for the nonvisiting group. This notable difference in group size 
indicates that financial analysts usually do not cluster in one specific site visit when scheduling 
their visits to a firm.  
As for the firm characteristics, the average market value is RMB10.3 billion (around 
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US$1.6 billion). The average institutional ownership is 44%. The average book-to-market ratio is 
0.360. And the average sales growth is 28%. Most firms have board independence lower than 
40%. More than half of the sample firms have board independence equal to exactly 33%, 
because of the CSRC’s regulatory requirement that at least one-third of directors be independent. 
Consistent with the general listed-firm population, only 1% of the visited firms are loss firms. 
Lastly, the sample firms have skewed buy-and-hold market-adjusted annual returns, with a mean 
of 15% but a median of 1%. 
4.2 Multivariate test for H1 
Table 3 reports the multivariate regression results for H1. Consistent with the univariate 
analysis, we find that visiting analysts experience a larger improvement in their forecast accuracy 
compared with nonvisiting analysts. The coefficient on Visit is significantly positive at the 0.01 
level (coefficient = 0.1292 with t = 5.13). This effect is also economically significant. The 
magnitude of the coefficient on Visit implies a relative improvement in forecast accuracy of 
about 10% based on the mean pre-visit forecast error of the visiting or nonvisiting analyst groups 
(1.24, as presented in Table 2). This result is consistent with H1 that analysts obtain useful 
information for earnings forecasts during their site visits.17 This result is also consistent with 
analysts’ beliefs. As one of our interviewees stated: “Site visits are the most important 
information channel for sell-side analysts to acquire information. I spend two-thirds of my 
working time on the road visiting companies.” 
In terms of control variables, we find that the coefficient on ΔHorizon is significantly 
positive, implying that the post-visit forecasts are more accurate than the pre-visit forecasts, 
which have a longer horizon. Analysts from larger brokerages and those who cover larger firms 
                                                 
17 Our interviews suggest that the site visits that occur in the month after quarterly earnings announcements or the 
initial announcements of mergers and acquisitions are likely to be initiated by the firms, rather than by the analysts. 
Our conclusions still hold after excluding these visits.  
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experience a smaller improvement, likely because they are more informed beforehand. In 
comparison, we find that analysts experience a larger improvement in forecast accuracy for firms 
with higher earnings volatility, higher book-to-market ratios, and losses.  
In summary, visiting analysts experience a larger improvement in forecast accuracy than 
nonvisiting analysts after controlling for other potential determinants. This finding implies that 
analysts obtain information from site visits that is useful for their earnings forecasts.  
4.3 Cross-sectional analyses for H2 
Table 4 reports the results from the test of H2. We construct indicator variables for 
manufacturing firms (Manufacture), for firms with more tangible assets (Tangibility), and for 
firms with more concentrated business lines (Concentration). Based on the CSRC’s industry 
classification, 66.1% of site visits are paid to manufacturing firms, as shown in Table 2. 
Tangibility equals 1 when the ratio of PP&E over total assets is greater than the sample median 
and 0 otherwise. The average PP&E/total assets is 0.23. To capture a firm’s business 
concentration, we use the Herfindahl-Hirschman index (HHI) of a firm’s segment sales. The 
average HHI is 0.604. Concentration equals 1 when the HHI of segment sales is greater than the 
sample median and 0 otherwise.  
As shown in Columns (1) to (3) of Table 4, the coefficients on the interaction terms, 
Visit×Manufacture, Visit×Tangibility, and Visit×Concentration, are positive and significant at 
the 0.05 level or better (t = 2.08, 2.30, and 2.81, respectively). These results are consistent with 
H2: analysts experience a larger improvement in forecast accuracy when they conduct site visits 
to manufacturing firms, firms with more tangible assets, and firms with more concentrated 
business.  
4.4 Cross-sectional analyses for H3 
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To test H3, we construct an indicator for site visits that are conducted by sell-side analysts 
only (AnalystOnly), which equals 1 for analyst-only visiting groups and 0 for visiting groups 
involving nonanalyst visitors (typically buy-side investors). Table 2 shows that 37% of the site 
visits are analyst-only. Column (1) of Table 5 presents the regression results. We find a positive 
coefficient on Visit×AnalystOnly (t = 7.07), suggesting that site visits are more effective in 
improving forecast accuracy when they are conducted by analysts only. This finding is consistent 
with the notion that sell-side analysts often accompany their clients on corporate site visits as a 
client service rather than as a means of information acquisition. One of our interviewed fund 
managers corroborated this, saying, “Sell-side analysts have quotas to organize site visit tours, 
which are viewed as part of their services.” 
To test the incremental effect of site visits for nonlocal visiting analysts, we construct an 
indicator for site visits dominated by nonlocal visiting analysts (Remote) (i.e., visits in which 
nonlocal visiting analysts outnumber local visiting analysts in attendance). Nonlocal analysts 
refer to those whose brokerages are located more than 400 kilometers away from the visited 
firm’s headquarters. As shown in Table 2, for 72.7% of the site visits, the visiting analysts 
consist mainly of nonlocal analysts. Column (2) of Table 5 presents the regression results. 
Consistent with the prediction, we find a positive coefficient on Visit×Remote (t = 9.90).  
Similarly, to test the incremental effect of site visits with fewer preceding visits, we 
construct an indicator variable (Unpreceded) for site visits with fewer than the median number of 
site visits conducted in the preceding month. As reported in Table 2, on average there are about 
1.7 site visits conducted in the month before the current site visit. Column (3) of Table 5 presents 
the regression results. We find a positive coefficient on Visit×Unpreceded (t = 2.84).  
In sum, consistent with H3, site visits are more effective in improving forecast accuracy 
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when they are conducted by analysts only and by analysts who are based farther away from the 
visited firms and when they are preceded by fewer site visits.  
 
5 Additional analyses  
5.1 An alternative explanation—self-selection of visiting analysts 
Skilled analysts may be more likely to conduct site visits and also may produce better 
forecasts, leading to a positive association between site visits and forecast accuracy. Another 
possibility is that analysts choose to visit the firms that they are more familiar with, and hence 
they produce more accurate forecasts based on their superior prior knowledge. If these 
alternative explanations are valid, we should expect visiting analysts to have more accurate 
earnings forecasts than nonvisiting analysts in the pre-visit period. However, as reported in Table 
2, the forecast accuracy of visiting analysts resembles that of nonvisiting analysts in the pre-visit 
period. To ensure that the univariate results are not driven by confounding factors, we also 
conduct a multivariate analysis of the level of forecast accuracy in the pre-visit period. As 
reported in Column (1) of Table 6, we find that there is no significant difference in forecast 
accuracy between visiting and nonvisiting analysts in the pre-visit period; the coefficient on the 
site visit indicator variable (Visit) is insignificant at conventional levels (t = −0.35).   
In contrast, when we examine the post-visit level of forecast accuracy, we find that forecast 
accuracy is higher for visiting analysts than for nonvisiting analysts, as reported in Column (2) of 
Table 6. The coefficient on Visit is significantly positive (t = 3.07). Therefore the relative 
improvement in visiting analysts’ forecast accuracy is driven by their more accurate post-visit 
forecasts. This is further supported by the regression results reported in Column (3), where we 
include both pre- and post-visit observations and add to the regression the post-visit indicator 
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(Post) and its interaction with Visit. We find that the coefficient on Visit is still insignificant 
(t=−0.24) but that on Visit×Post is significantly positive (t = 5.67). This finding suggests that 
visiting and nonvisiting analysts have similar forecast accuracy before site visits; afterward, 
visitors show greater accuracy than nonvisitors. 
To further address the self-selection issue, we impose an additional requirement on the 
benchmark group. Specifically, for each firm, we exclude the nonvisiting analysts who did not 
conduct any site visits to the firm over the entire sample period. As such, the reduced nonvisiting 
analyst group consists only of the analysts who visit the firm at other times. This additional data 
requirement ensures that visiting and nonvisiting analysts are more comparable in terms of 
conducting site visits to the same firm; they just visit the firm at different times. Column (1) of 
Table 7 presents the regression results for this sample. The coefficient on Visit remains 
significantly positive (t = 6.94), suggesting that the improvement in visiting analysts’ forecast 
accuracy is due to the information obtained from site visits, not their choice of conducting site 
visits. 
In the same vein, analysts with better access to managers may be more likely to conduct 
site visits and more capable of acquiring information during visits. To address this concern, we 
exclude the analysts who issue strong-buy recommendations in the year before site visits and 
those analysts who have investment banking relationships with the firm in the past, because they 
presumably have better access to managers. The regression results for this sample are reported in 
Column (2) of Table 7. Our inferences remain the same: the coefficient on Visit is significantly 
positive (t = 5.67).  
In summary, these additional analyses indicate that our results are not driven by the 
alternative explanations based on the self-selection of visiting analysts.  
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5.2 An alternative explanation—selective disclosure 
It is unclear whether the benefits of site visits come from analysts assembling an 
information mosaic, as discussed above, or from managers’ selective disclosure during the visits. 
While selective disclosure is hard to detect, we identify two cases where selective disclosure is 
more likely to occur and then examine whether our results are stronger in these cases. First, we 
expect that selective disclosure is more likely to occur during site visits to the firms that violated 
disclosure rules and later were investigated by regulators. Second, we expect that analysts with 
favorable relationships with the firm are more likely to visit it regularly, and thus selective 
disclosure is more likely to occur during their visits. However, in untabulated analyses, we find 
that site visits in these cases are not more useful than others. That is, we fail to find any evidence 
consistent with selective disclosure.18 Even so, we acknowledge that selective disclosure is hard 
to detect, and we leave it to future research to investigate to what extent the benefits we 
document are driven by selective disclosure. 
5.3 Alternative research design—comparison based on the same-analyst observations  
Our analyses so far are based on the comparison between visiting and nonvisiting analysts. 
We use the difference-in-differences design to address potential omitted analyst characteristics. 
To further address the concern that unobservable factors might affect visiting and nonvisiting 
analysts differently, we use the observations from the same visiting analysts and conduct two 
tests to examine whether analyst forecast accuracy improves after site visits. In the first test, we 
compare the relative accuracy of earnings forecasts issued for firms visited by an analyst versus 
that for firms not visited by the same analyst in the same year. If site visits improve forecast 
                                                 
18 To the extent that selective disclosure is more likely to occur during the visits of the analysts who have favorable 
opinions of the firm, the robust results after excluding the site visits conducted by the analysts who have issued 
strong-buy recommendations recently for the firm or by those with investment banking relationships with the firm, 
as reported in Column (2) of Table 7, also suggest that selective disclosure is not driving our results.  
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accuracy, the relative forecast accuracy should be higher for the former than for the latter. In the 
second test, we focus on analyst-firm pairs and compare the relative forecast accuracy in the 
years when an analyst visits the firm versus in the years when she does not. Again, if site visits 
improve forecast accuracy, the relative forecast accuracy should be higher in the former.  
Under the alternative research design, the unit of analysis is analyst-firm-year. Following 
Bae et al. (2008), we calculate the relative forecast accuracy measure (Rel_Accuracy ) as follows: 
ܴ݈݁_ܣܿܿݑݎܽܿݕ௜,௝,௧ ൌ ሺെ1ሻ ൈ ஺ிா೔,ೕ,೟ି஺௩௚_஺ிாೕ,೟஺௩௚_஺ிாೕ,೟ , 
where AFEi,j,t is the forecast error of analyst i for firm j in year t. For each analyst, we calculate 
forecast error using the analyst’s most recent annual earnings forecast issued in the year before 
the firm’s earnings announcement. Avg_AFEj,t is the mean forecast error of all analysts who 
cover firm j in fiscal year t. A positive value of Rel_Accuracy indicates that the forecast error of 
analyst i for firm j in year t is smaller than the average forecast error for firm j in year t. We then 
estimate the following regression to test whether site visits improve forecast accuracy: 
ܴ݈݁_ܣܿܿݑݎܽܿݕ௜,௝,௧ ൌ α ൅ ߚܸ݅ݏ݅ݐ_ܨݎ݁ݍ௜,௝,௧ ൅ ࢽ	࡯࢕࢔࢚࢘࢕࢒࢙ ൅ ߝ௜,௝,௧.																						ሺ4ሻ 
 
We define the count variable Visit_freqi,j,t as 2 (1, 0) if analyst i visits firm j two or more (one, 
zero) times in the six months before the issue date of the most recent earnings forecast or in the 
period between last year’s earnings announcement date and the issue date of the most recent 
earnings forecast, whichever is longer.19  
Table 8 reports the regression results. Column (1) provides the comparison across firms 
followed by the same analyst within the same year, and Column (2) provides the comparison 
across years within the same analyst-firm pair. As reported in the table, the coefficient on 
Visit_freq is significantly positive in both columns (t = 10.63 and 4.36, respectively). These 
                                                 
19 Due to the data requirement for calculating Visit_freq (i.e., information related to site visit frequencies in the past 
six months), the sample of earnings forecasts includes those with forecasting dates of July 2009 onward. 
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results suggest that analysts’ earnings forecasts for a firm are more accurate when they visit this 
firm than when they do not visit it in the same year or than their forecasts for the same firm but 
in the years they do not visit it. Overall, these analyses indicate that our inferences are not driven 
by unobservable analyst or firm characteristics. 
5.4 Investors’ response to visiting analysts’ forecast revisions after site visits 
Visiting analysts usually disclose in their reports that their earnings forecasts and 
recommendations are based on the recent site visits.20 To the extent that investors are aware of 
the usefulness of analysts’ site visits, we expect that conducting site visits increases the 
credibility of the earnings forecasts issued by visiting analysts after site visits. This is consistent 
with the insights obtained from our interviews. As noted by one interviewed analyst: “The 
credibility of such a report is greatly enhanced if my interpretation of the past and my predictions 
of the future are echoed by company managers. This not only boosts my confidence in my 
reports but also makes them more convincing for the readers.”  
Following prior studies (e.g., Abarbanell, Lanen, and Verrecchia 1995; Clement and Tse 
2003; Keung 2010), we measure the perceived credibility of earnings forecasts using the forecast 
response coefficient for forecast revisions. We then investigate whether the market reaction to 
the same unit of forecast revision is larger when such forecast revisions are issued by visiting 
analysts after site visits. For this purpose, we estimate the following regression model:  
ܥܣܴ௜,௝,௧ ൌ α ൅ ߚଵܧܨ_ܴ݁ݒ௜,௝,௧ ൅ ߚଶܸ݅ݏ݅ݐ_݌ݎ݁ݒ_݉݋݊ݐ݄௜,௝,௧ ൅ ߚଷܧܨ_ܴ݁ݒ௜,௝,௧ ൈ ܸ݅ݏ݅ݐ_݌ݎ݁ݒ_݉݋݊ݐ݄௜,௝,௧
൅ ᅷ	࡯࢕࢔࢚࢘࢕࢒࢙ ൅ ߝ௞,௝,௧.																																																																																																								ሺ5ሻ	 
 
CAR is measured as the three-day cumulative size-adjusted return surrounding the earnings 
                                                 
20 Based on a sample of 250 randomly selected analyst reports that were issued by the visiting analysts in the month 
after their site visits, we find that 186 of these reports prominently use the term “site visit” in the report titles, in 
various forms such as “site visit briefing,” “site visit report,” or “site visit bulletin.” For the remaining reports, eight 
reports mention “site visit” as one of the information sources in the textual body of the reports. In total, 77.6% (= 
(186+8)/250) of the randomly selected analyst reports explicitly disclose analysts’ recent site visits.  
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forecast revision. Earnings forecast revision (EF_Rev) is measured as the difference between an 
analyst’s annual earnings forecast for the current year and that analyst’s own prior forecast, 
scaled by the stock price at the end of the month before the revision. To capture analysts’ site 
visits, we use the indicator variable Visit_prev_monthi,j,t, which equals 1 if analyst i visited firm j 
in the month before the current forecast revision and 0 otherwise. We require the sample firms to 
have at least one forecast revision observation with Visit_ prev_month = 1 and at least one 
forecast revision observation with Visit_ prev_month = 0 over the sample period. Of the sample 
of 17,317 forecast revisions, 11.97% are issued by visiting analysts in the month after their site 
visits (i.e., Visit_ prev_month = 1). The variable of interest is the interaction term EF_Rev× 
Visit_ prev_month. The estimated coefficient on this variable captures the incremental effect of 
analysts’ site visits on the forecast response coefficient.  
Table 9 reports the regression results. Consistent with prior literature, the market reaction is 
positively associated with forecast revisions (t = 6.26). More importantly, the markets appear to 
respond more to the forecast revisions issued by visiting analysts than those by nonvisiting 
analysts, as evidenced by the positive coefficient on the interaction term (t = 2.35). These 
findings triangulate the main finding by showing that site visits increase the credibility of visiting 
analysts’ forecast revisions.  
5.5 Site visits and local advantage 
Prior studies find that local analysts’ earnings forecasts are more accurate than those issued 
by nonlocal analysts, likely due to local analysts’ information advantage (Malloy 2005; Bae et al. 
2008). Given our finding that forecast accuracy improves after site visits, two questions arise. 
First, does conducting site visits contribute to the local analysts’ advantage? Second, can 
nonlocal analysts overcome their disadvantage by conducting site visits? 
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Prior research suggests that site visits may be an information channel behind the local 
analysts’ advantage. For example, Coval and Moskowitz (2001) suggest that “investors located 
near a firm can visit the firm’s operations, talk to suppliers and employees, as well as assess the 
local market conditions in which the firm operates.” Bae et al. (2008) propose that local analysts 
have an advantage because they can gain access to a firm’s soft information, make on-site 
observations of the firm’s operations, and interact directly with the firm’s executives. To 
examine whether conducting site visits at least partially explains local analysts’ information 
advantage, we construct an indicator variable for nonlocal analysts (Nonlocal). We then estimate 
the following regression to investigate whether the effect of geographic proximity on forecast 
accuracy continues to hold after controlling for the effect of site visits: 
ܴ݈݁_ܣܿܿݑݎܽܿݕ௜,௝,௧ ൌ α ൅ ߚଵܰ݋݊_݈݋݈ܿܽ௜,௝,௧ ൅ ߚଶܸ݅ݏ݅ݐ_ܨݎ݁ݍ௜,௝,௧ ൅ ࢽ	࡯࢕࢔࢚࢘࢕࢒࢙ ൅ ߝ௜,௝,௧.																			ሺ6ሻ 
 
The dependent variable, Rel_Accuracy, and Visit_freq are as defined in Section 5.3. The 
indicator variable, Non_local, equals 1 for the analysts whose brokerages are more than 400 
kilometers (or 250 miles) away from the visited firm’s headquarters and 0 otherwise.  
Table 10 presents the regression results.21 Column (1) confirms that nonlocal analysts’ 
forecasts are less accurate than those issued by local analysts. The coefficient on Non-local is 
significantly negative (t = −2.86). Column (2) shows that consistent with the results reported in 
previous sections, forecasts issued by analysts with more site visits are more accurate, as shown 
by the positive coefficient on Visit_freq (t = 8.15). Column (3) includes both the local analyst 
indicator and site visit frequency. The coefficient on Non_local remains significantly negative (t 
= −2.39). The coefficient on Visit_freq also remains statistically significant (t = 7.99). The 
                                                 
21 Following Bae et al. (2008), we require that at least one local analyst and one nonlocal analyst follow the sample 
firm-years. This requirement helps alleviate the concern that local and nonlocal analysts choose to follow firms with 
different fundamentals. In addition, we exclude the stale earnings forecasts, i.e., those issued more than 300 days 
before earnings announcements. The final sample for this test consists of 17,714 earnings forecasts from July 2009 
to 2012. 
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similar magnitude of the coefficients on Non_local in columns (1) and (3) (−0.0190 versus 
−0.0168) indicates that site visits are not the primary driver of local analysts’ advantage. 
We then investigate whether nonlocal analysts can overcome their disadvantage by 
conducting site visits. As nonlocal analysts benefit more from site visits than local analysts, we 
add an interaction term of Non-local and Visit_freq to Equation (6) and report the regression 
results in Column (4) of Table 10. The coefficient on Non_local continues to be significantly 
negative, and the coefficient on Visit_freq continues to be significantly positive, although with a 
smaller magnitude. The coefficient on the interaction term is also significantly positive (t = 5.24), 
suggesting that the positive effect of site visits on forecast accuracy is more pronounced for 
nonlocal analysts than for local ones. The net effect for nonlocal analysts who conduct one site 
visit is the sum of the three coefficients: −0.0300 + 0.0108 + 0.0364 = 0.0172, with a two-sided 
p-value of 0.094 (untabulated). This suggests that the forecasts issued by nonlocal analysts who 
conduct one site visit are as accurate as those issued by local analysts who do not conduct any 
visits. If nonlocal analysts visit twice or more (i.e., Visit_freq = 2), their forecasts are more 
accurate than those issued by local analysts who do not visit (−0.0300 + 2×0.0108 + 2×0.0364 = 
0.0644, with a p-value of 0.01, untabulated). 
In summary, these analyses suggest that site visits are not the primary drivers of the local 
analysts’ advantage, as suggested in prior studies. The local advantage probably arises from 
other information channels, such as social networking with executives and employees and a 
better understanding of the local market and economic situation. However, our analyses indicate 
that conducting site visits can help nonlocal analysts to overcome their information disadvantage. 
5.6 Why do not all analysts conduct site visits? 
Our results so far suggest that analysts obtain useful information from their site visits. A 
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natural question that arises is why all analysts do not visit the firms they follow. In this section, 
we investigate the factors that affect analysts’ site visit decisions. We argue that these decisions 
are affected by the tradeoff between the costs and benefits of conducting site visits. On the cost 
side, we expect that analysts are less likely to visit firms located farther away or if they have 
more limited financial sources (i.e., working for a smaller brokerage). On the benefit side, as 
discussed above, we find that analysts’ visits to manufacturing firms, firms with more tangible 
assets, and firms with more concentrated businesses are more useful than other visits. Thus we 
expect that analysts are more likely to visit these firms. We use the indicators for manufacturing 
firms (Manufacture), firms with high asset tangibility (Tangibility), and firms with high business 
concentration (Concentration) as the proxies for the benefits.22  
To examine individual analysts’ decision to conduct site visits to a specific firm in a 
specific year, we generate a sample of analyst-firm-year observations, where the analyst has 
issued at least one earnings forecast or stock recommendation for this firm in the previous or the 
current year. After imposing other data requirements, the final sample consists of 49,553 analyst-
firm-year observations for 1,395 unique firms over the sample period of 2009–2012.  
To capture the site visit decision, we use an indicator variable, Visit_firm, which equals one 
when an analyst conducts a site visit to the firm in the current year and zero otherwise. Visit_firm 
is coded as one for 25.1% of the sample. Table 11 reports the logistic regression results. First, 
consistent with our expectation on the costs of conducting site visits, we find that the coefficient 
on the geographical distance (Distance) is significantly negative (z-value = −7.84) and that on 
brokerage size is significantly positive (z-value = 5.38). These findings indicate that analysts are 
                                                 
22 We acknowledge that some of the factors affect both the costs and benefits. For example, while the cost of 
conducting site visits increases with geographical distance, the benefit also increases with it, as analysts generally 
know less about distant firms and thus the information obtained from visits is more important. As such, the results 
reflect the net effect. Also, this is by no means a comprehensive list of proxies for the costs and benefits of 
conducting site visits. 
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less likely to visit when firms are more distant or when the analysts have more limited financial 
resources. On the benefit side, we find that analysts are more likely to visit firms with higher 
levels of asset tangibility and those with greater business concentration; the coefficients on 
Tangibility and Concentration are significantly positive (z-value=2.77 and 2.84, respectively). 
We also find that the coefficient on Manufacture is positive but not statistically significant (z-
value =1.64).  
We include a series of control variables in the regression. We find that analysts are more 
likely to visit a firm if they have a favorable opinion of it (StrongBuy), if the firm has a higher 
disclosure rating (Disclosure_rating) and more analysts following it (ANA), or if the firm is older 
(Age). They are less likely to visit state-owned enterprises (SOE).  
Overall, these findings are consistent with the notion that the likelihood of analysts’ site 
visits increases with the expected benefits and decreases with the costs of conducting site visits. 
 
6 Conclusion 
This study examines how corporate site visits affect analysts’ forecast performance. Unlike 
prior studies, we directly capture analyst information acquisition by exploiting the mandatory 
disclosure of analysts’ corporate site visits in China. Using a difference-in-differences approach, 
we find that visiting analysts experience an improvement in their forecast accuracy after site 
visits, compared to analysts who do not visit. This improvement is more pronounced for 
manufacturing firms, firms with more tangible assets, and firms with more concentrated business 
lines. Moreover, the improvement is larger when the visits are conducted by analysts only, when 
the visiting analysts are based farther from the visited firms, and when the site visits are preceded 
by fewer site visits to the firm. 
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We conduct several additional analyses and find that our results are not driven by the 
potentially different attributes of visiting and non-visiting analysts or firms’ selective disclosure 
during site visits. Consistent with the notion that analysts obtain an information advantage 
through site visits, we document a stronger market response to the forecast revisions issued by 
visiting analysts than those by nonvisiting analysts. We also document that site visits help 
nonlocal analysts overcome their information disadvantage. Lastly, we conduct a determinant 
analysis and find that the likelihood of analysts’ site visits increases with the expected benefits 
and decreases with the expected costs. 
This study contributes to the literature by presenting evidence that corporate site visits, a 
form of active information acquisition, improve analysts’ forecast performance. Our empirical 
results are largely consistent with the insights obtained from our interviews with sell-side 
analysts, firm IR managers, and fund managers. The richness of the data provides many future 
research opportunities. For example, some analysts conduct site visits to firms that they do not 
cover. It would be interesting to examine the benefit of the visits to these analysts. Are they 
obtaining information on the peers, customers, or suppliers of the firms they cover? Many 
analysts offer site visit services to their buy-side clients. It would also be interesting to examine 
how exactly analysts benefit from offering such services. Do they obtain more commissions for 
their brokerages? Do they obtain more votes as the top analysts? Starting from 2013, the detailed 
meeting minutes of site visits are available on the SZSE website. A textual analysis of these 
meeting transcripts could enrich our understanding of the information acquisition process during 
the site visits. We leave these interesting questions to future research.   
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APPENDIX A 
A site visit example: Extract of the 2011 annual report of Shenzhen Airport Co. Ltd. 
 
During the reporting period, the company follows the information disclosure guidelines and investor 
relationship management bylaws issued by the SZSE. The company communicates with investors by 
hosting site visits and holding one-on-one meetings with institutional investors and by taking phone calls 
from individual investors.23 During the reporting period, the company meets with 54 individuals from 
various institutions. During these visits, the company discusses its general operations and future strategy 
with investors based on public information. The company does not selectively disclose information to 
investors. The site visits are detailed as follows. 
Time Visitor Topics of discussion and materials provided 
Jan. 5, 2011 Everbright Securities Recent company updates 
Jan. 11, 2011 China International Capital Co. Ltd. Recent company updates 
Jan. 21, 2011 Changjiang Securities, China Investment 
Securities 
Progress of construction and recent operations
Mar. 23, 2011 CITIC Securities  Recent company updates 
Mar. 24, 2011 Changjiang Securities, Baoying Fund 
Management, Huatai-PineBridge 
Investments 
Company operation and construction 
expansion 
Apr. 12, 2011 GF Securities, China Merchants Fund Construction of T3, and the business 
circumstances of main operations and 
nonflight-related operations 
Apr. 20, 2011 Guosen Securities, Harvest Fund, Guotai 
AMC, Sino Life Insurance, Dacheng 
Fund 
Company fundamentals 
May 12, 2011 Taikang AMC Company fundamentals 
May 19, 2011 Changjiang Securities, Chengrui 
Investment 
Construction of T3 and recent company 
updates 
June 10, 2011 Ping An Securities Recent company updates 
June 13, 2011 Hongyuan Securities Convertible bond and business circumstances 
June 23, 2011 Investor Conference hosted by 
Changjiang Securities 
Introduction of current business picture and 
topical issues 
Aug. 16, 2011 Bosera Securities, Dacheng Securities Fundamentals and convertible bond 
Aug. 19, 2011 Ping An Annuity Insurance  Company fundamentals 
Sep. 29, 2011 JS Cresvale Securities Company fundamentals 
Nov. 7, 2011 UBS Company fundamentals 
Nov. 17, 2011 China Merchants Fund Company fundamentals 
Dec. 8, 2011 Upstone Capital, Kangqiao Asset, Houde 
Investment 
Company fundamentals 
Dec. 14, 2011 Guotai Junan Company fundamentals 
Dec. 15, 2011 GF Securities Company fundamentals 
Dec. 19, 2011 Everbright Securities Company fundamentals 
                                                 
23 Companies occasionally include telephone interviews, webinars, email exchanges, nondeal road shows, investor 
conferences, industry summits, industry forums, annual broker conferences, and one-on-one meetings with 
managers in this section. We include only the site visits (held at company headquarters or subsidiaries) in the current 
study. 
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APPENDIX B 
Variable definitions  
 
 
Dependent variable (site visit event-analyst group level variables) 
߂ܣܿܿݑݎܽܿݕ௞,௝,௧ ൌ െሺܲ݋ݏݐ_ܸ݅ݏ݅ݐ_ܣܨܧ௞,௝,௧ െ ܲݎ݁_ܸ݅ݏ݅ݐ_ܣܨܧ௞,௝,௧ሻ 
 = −1 times the change in the absolute forecast error of analyst group k 
(visiting or nonvisiting analysts) for firm j from the six months before 
the site visit conducted on day t to one month after. A positive value 
implies an improvement in forecast accuracy from the pre- to post-visit 
periods. For each analyst group, we identify the most recent annual EPS 
forecast issued by each analyst within the group in the six months before 
the site visit, calculate the group mean as the group consensus forecast, 
and calculate Pre_Visit_AFE as the absolute difference between the 
group consensus EPS forecast and actual EPS, scaled by the stock price 
at the beginning of the year, expressed in percentage. To calculate 
Post_Visit_AFE, we identify the first forecast made by the analysts in the 
same group in the month after the site visit and calculate their forecast 
consensus and the absolute forecast error for the same group in the 
period after the site visit. For the analysts who do not update their 
forecasts in the post-visit period, we assume their post-visit forecasts to 
be the same as their pre-visit forecasts. If an analyst does not issue a pre-
visit earnings forecast (but does issue a post-visit earnings forecast), then 
we use the mean forecast of all of the other analysts’ forecasts in the pre-
visit period as the pre-visit forecast for such an analyst when calculating 
the forecast accuracy change. 
 
Key independent variable (site visit event-analyst group level variables) 
Visitk,j,t = An indicator variable that equals 1 for the visiting analyst group and 0 
for the nonvisiting analyst group. An analyst is a visiting analyst if 
he/she visits firm j on a site visit event day t. The analysts who follow 
the same firm but do not visit it in the six months before or one month 
after the site visit of interest are referred to as nonvisiting analysts.  
   
Variables for cross-sectional analyses (firm-year level and visiting group level variables) 
Manufacturej,t = An indicator variable that equals 1 when the firm is a manufacturing firm 
and 0 otherwise. 
Tangibilityj,t = An indicator variable that equals 1 when the ratio of PP&E over total 
assets is greater than or equal to the sample median and 0 otherwise.  
Concentrationj,t = An indicator variable that equals 1 when the firm’s Herfindahl-
Hirschman index (HHI) based on segment revenue is greater than or 
equal to the sample median and 0 otherwise. Segment revenue HHI 
equals the sum of squares of the ratio of segment revenue to the total 
revenue for firm j in the current year. 
AnalystOnlyk,j,t = An indicator variable for analyst-only visits. It equals 1 if all of the 
visitors are sell-side analysts and 0 otherwise. 
Remotek,j,t = An indicator variable for nonlocal analysts. It equals 1 if nonlocal 
analysts outnumber the local analysts in the visiting groups and 0 
otherwise. Nonlocal analysts are those whose brokerages are located 
more than 400 kilometers (250 miles) from the visited firm’s 
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headquarters. 
Unprecededk,j,t = An indicator variable for firms with fewer preceding visits within the 
month before the site visit of interest. It equals 1 if the number of 
preceding site visits within the one-month window before the current site 
visit t is below the sample median for the visiting group and 0 otherwise. 
This variable is coded as 0 for nonvisiting groups. 
 
Control variables  
ΔHorizonk,j,t = Change in forecast horizon, calculated as the log transformation of the 
decrease in the average forecast horizon of analyst group k (visiting or 
nonvisiting group) from the pre- to post-visit periods. The forecast 
horizon is defined as the number of days between the forecast issue date 
and corresponding earnings announcement date. 
Firmexpk,j,t = Analyst-firm-specific experience, calculated as the log transformation of 
the average firm-specific experience of all of the analysts in analyst 
group k for firm j. Firm-specific experience is calculated as the number 
of years between an analyst’s first forecast for firm j and his/her current 
forecast for firm j. 
Brokersizek,j,t = Brokerage size, defined as the average number of analysts working for 
the brokerages in group k. 
ANA_groupk,j,t = Group size, calculated as the log transformation of the number of 
analysts in group k.  
MVj,t = Firm size, calculated as the log transformation of the market value of 
equity of firm j at the end of the last fiscal year. 
Inst_holdingj,t = Institutional ownership, calculated as the ownership percentage of 
institutional investors. 
Indepj,t = Board independence, calculated as the ratio of the number of 
independent directors to the total number of directors for firm j in the 
current year. 
BMj,t = Book-to-market ratio, calculated as the book value of equity divided by 
the market value of equity. 
Growthj,t = Revenue growth, defined as the revenue in year t divided by the revenue 
in year t−1. 
Lossj,t = Loss indicator that equals 1 if the net income is negative in year t and 0 
otherwise. 
BHARj,t = The buy-and-hold market-adjusted returns in year t. 
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TABLE 1  
Sample selection 
This table reports the sample selection procedure for our sample of analysts’ site visits during 2009–2012. 
  
No. of total 
site visits 
No. of total 
firms 
1. Site visits involving sell-side analysts 
 
 18,259 1,298
2. Combining site visits with adjacent event dates as one event 
and using the first day as the event day 
 
 16,913 1,269 
3. Requiring visiting analysts as a group to issue at least one 
earnings forecast during the 18 months before the 
forthcoming earnings announcement date 
 9,730 1,105 
    
4. Requiring visiting and nonvisiting analysts to issue at least 
one earnings forecast during the six months before and one 
month after the site visit 
 
 7,154 965 
5. Dropping financial firms and events with missing values for 
control variables 
 6,651 931 
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TABLE 2  
Descriptive statistics  
This table presents the summary statistics of the variables used in the main analyses. The sample includes 
6,651 site visit events and 13,302 observations with required data, including 6,651 observations from the 
visiting groups and 6,651 observations from the nonvisiting groups. Please see Appendix B for the 
variable definitions. ***, **, and * indicate that the difference between visiting and nonvisiting groups in 
the corresponding variable is statistically significant at the 0.01, 0.05, and 0.10 levels, respectively.  
Variables Obs. Mean STD Q1 Median Q3 
For visiting analyst group       
Pre-visit forecast errors 6,651 1.241 1.955 1.609 0.659* 0.231 
Post-visit forecast errors 6,651 1.077*** 1.771 1.359 0.533*** 0.183 
ΔAccuracy  6,651 0.164*** 0.869 0.000 0.000*** 0.090 
Pre-visit horizon  6,651 183.765*** 67.532 126.400 186.000*** 241.000 
Post-visit horizon  6,651 126.125*** 66.916 71.000 125.000*** 185.000 
ΔHorizon (raw)  6,651 57.641*** 30.182 33.000 53.000*** 77.000 
Firmexp  6,651 2.435*** 1.865 1.000 2.000*** 3.000 
Brokersize  6,651 33.691*** 12.559 26.000 33.333*** 42.000 
ANA_group  6,651 1.385*** 0.934 1.000 1.000*** 1.000 
For non-visiting analyst group       
Pre-visit forecast errors 6,651  1.242 2.038 1.588 0.699 0.248 
Post-visit forecast errors 6,651  1.201 2.103 1.524 0.671 0.237 
ΔAccuracy 6,651 0.041 0.557 0.000 0.000 0.003 
Pre-visit horizon  6,651 190.310 64.901 129.537 195.800 244.333 
Post-visit horizon  6,651 121.053 66.322 66.200 121.000 180.000 
ΔHorizon (raw)  6,651 69.256 23.491 52.889 67.612 84.316 
Firmexp  6,651 2.243 1.236 1.250 2.000 3.000 
Brokersize  6,651 28.774 7.424 24.500 28.571 32.750 
ANA_group  6,651 7.234 5.120 3.000 6.000 10.000 
Control variables  
MV (raw, in millions RMB) 6,651 10,317 15,002 3,113 5,464 10,527 
NI_std 6,651 0.050 0.050 0.020 0.040 0.070 
Inst_holding 6,651 0.440 0.240 0.250 0.440 0.630 
Indep 6,651 0.370 0.060 0.330 0.330 0.400 
BM 6,651 0.360 0.200 0.210 0.320 0.460 
Growth 6,651 0.280 0.340 0.080 0.230 0.390 
Loss 6,651 0.010 0.100 0.000 0.000 0.000 
BHAR 6,651 0.150 0.470 -0.100 0.010 0.290 
Variables for the cross-sectional analyses 
Manufacture 6,651 0.661 0.473 0.000 1.000 1.000 
PP&E/Assets  6,651 0.232 0.165 0.105 0.200 0.317 
SegHHI 6,567 0.604 0.250 0.411 0.633 0.796 
AnalystOnly (visiting group) 6,651 0.370 0.483 0.000 0.000 1.000 
Remote (visiting group) 6,648 0.727 0.446 0.000 1.000 1.000 
Unpreceded (visiting group) 
(raw number of preceding visits) 6,651 1.690 1.800 0.000 1.000 3.000 
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TABLE 3 
The change in forecast accuracy for visiting and nonvisiting analyst groups around site visits 
This table presents the OLS regression results of the forecast accuracy change on the site visit indicator 
and control variables: 
	߂ܣܿܿݑݎܽܿݕ௞,௝,௧ ൌ α ൅ ߚܸ݅ݏ݅ݐ௞,௝,௧ ൅ ߛଵ߂݄݋ݎ݅ݖ݋݊௞,௝,௧ ൅ ߛଶܨ݅ݎ݉݁ݔ݌௞,௝,௧ ൅ ߛଷܤݎ݋݇݁ݎݏ݅ݖ݁௞,௝,௧ 	
൅ ߛସܣܰܣ_݃ݎ݋ݑ݌௞,௝,௧ 	൅ ߛହܯ ௝ܸ,௧ ൅ ߛ଺ܰܫ_ݏݐ݀௝,௧ ൅ ߛ଻ܫ݊ݏݐ_݄݋݈݀݅݊݃௝,௧ ൅ ߛ଼ܫ݊݀݁݌௝,௧
൅ ߛଽܤܯ௝,௧ ൅ ߛଵ଴ܩݎ݋ݓݐ ௝݄,௧ ൅ ߛଵଵܮ݋ݏݏ௝,௧ ൅ ߛଵଶܤܪܣ ௝ܴ,௧ ൅ ܫ݊݀ݑݏݐݎݕ௝,௧ ൅ ߝ௞,௝,௧.																		 
The dependent variable is the forecast accuracy change for an analyst group from the pre- to post-visit 
periods (ΔAccuracy). The full sample consists of 13,302 observations from 2009 to 2012. For each site 
visit, there is one observation for the visiting analyst group and one observation for the nonvisiting 
analyst group. The t-values in brackets are based on standard errors adjusted for firm and year clustering. 
***, **, and * indicate that the coefficients are significant at the 0.01, 0.05, and 0.10 levels, respectively, 
based on two-tailed statistical tests. Please see Appendix B for variable definitions. 
 Coeff. (t-value) 
Visit (H1: +) 0.1292*** 
(5.13) 
ΔHorizon 0.0582*** 
(8.23) 
Firmexp -0.0014 
(-0.20) 
Brokersize -0.0384* 
(-1.92) 
ANA_group 0.0073 
(0.75) 
MV -0.0265** 
 (-2.53) 
NI_std 0.2977*** 
 (4.74) 
Inst_holding 0.0444 
(0.97) 
Indep -0.0176 
(-0.26) 
BM 0.1235*** 
 (2.58) 
Growth -0.0380 
 (-1.12) 
Loss 0.2506** 
 (2.36) 
BHAR 0.0107 
 (0.80) 
Industry Fixed Effects Yes 
Observations 13,302 
Adj. R2 0.039 
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TABLE 4 
The effect of firm characteristics on the usefulness of analysts’ site visits  
 
This table presents the results from the following regression: 
 
߂ܣܿܿݑݎܽܿݕ௞,௝,௧ ൌ α ൅ ߚଵܸ݅ݏ݅ݐ௞,௝,௧ ൅ ߚଶܨ݅ݎ݉_݄ܿܽݎ௝,௧ ൅ ߚଷܸ݅ݏ݅ݐ௞,௝,௧ ൈ ܨ݅ݎ݉_݄ܿܽݎ௝,௧ ൅ ࢽ	࡯࢕࢔࢚࢘࢕࢒࢙ ൅
ߝ௞,௝,௧	.    
The dependent variable is the forecast accuracy change for an analyst group from the pre- to post-visit 
periods (ΔAccuracy). Firm_char is the indicator for manufacturing firms (Manufacture) in Column (1), 
the asset tangibility level (Tangibility) in Column (2), and the business concentration level (Concentration) 
in Column (3).  
 
The full sample consists of 13,302 observations from 2009 to 2012. For each site visit, there is one 
observation for the visiting analyst group and one for the nonvisiting group. The t-values in brackets are 
based on standard errors adjusted for firm and year clustering. ***, **, and * indicate that the coefficients 
are significant at the 0.01, 0.05, and 0.10 levels, respectively, based on two-tailed statistical tests. Please 
see Appendix B for variable definitions. 
  
43 
 
TABLE 4 (Cont’d) 
 
 Column (1)
Firm_char  
= Manufacture
Column (2)
Firm_ char  
= Tangibility
Column (3)
Firm_ char  
= Concentration
Visit  0.1096*** 0.1121*** 0.1005*** 
 (4.28) (6.25) (3.00) 
Firm_char -0.0116 0.0027 0.0127 
 (-0.31) (0.49) (1.13) 
Visit×Firm_char (H2:+) 0.0294** 0.0354** 0.0524*** 
 (2.08) (2.30) (2.81) 
ΔHorizon 0.0581*** 0.0584*** 0.0591*** 
 (8.21) (8.12) (7.61) 
Firmexp -0.0017 -0.0031 -0.0038 
 (-0.24) (-0.40) (-0.60) 
Brokersize -0.0377* -0.0365* -0.0386* 
 (-1.87) (-1.82) (-1.87) 
ANA_group 0.0072 0.0078 0.0091 
 (0.73) (0.80) (0.93) 
MV -0.0265** -0.0262** -0.0280*** 
 (-2.52) (-2.48) (-2.74) 
NI_std 0.2974*** 0.3215*** 0.2969*** 
 (4.73) (5.60) (4.18) 
Inst_holding 0.0445 0.0416 0.0370 
 (0.97) (0.92) (0.78) 
Indep -0.0177 -0.0081 -0.0204 
 (-0.26) (-0.12) (-0.31) 
BM 0.1236** 0.1165** 0.1229** 
 (2.58) (2.36) (2.57) 
Growth -0.0380 -0.0380 -0.0379 
 (-1.12) (-1.14) (-1.10) 
Loss 0.2506** 0.2453** 0.2481** 
 (2.36) (2.32) (2.33) 
BHAR 0.0107 0.0098 0.0092 
 (0.80) (0.70) (0.71) 
Industry Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes 
    
Observations 13,302 13,302 13,134 
Adj. R2 0.039 0.039 0.040 
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 TABLE 5 
The effect of visitors’ characteristics on the usefulness of analysts’ site visits 
This table presents the results of the following regression: 
߂ܣܿܿݑݎܽܿݕ௞,௝,௧ ൌ α ൅ ߚଵܸ݅ݏ݅ݐ௞,௝,௧ ൅ ߚଶܸ݅ݏ݅ݐ௞,௝,௧ ൈ ܸ݅ݏ݅ݐ_݄ܿܽݎ௞,௝,௧ 	൅ ࢽ	࡯࢕࢔࢚࢘࢕࢒࢙ ൅ ߝ௞,௝,௧. 
The dependent variable is the forecast accuracy change for an analyst group from the pre- to the post-visit 
periods (ΔAccuracy). Visit_char is the analyst-only visit indicator (AnalystOnly) in Column (1), the 
remote visit indicator (Remote) in Column (2), and the indicator for fewer preceding site visits 
(Unpreceded) in Column (3). These variables are coded as 0 for nonvisiting groups. The full sample 
consists of 13,302 observations from 2009 to 2012, with one for visiting and one for nonvisiting analyst 
group for each site visit. The t-values are based on standard errors adjusted for firm and year clustering. 
***, **, and * indicate the 0.01, 0.05, and 0.10 significance levels. Please see Appendix B for variable 
definitions. 
 
Column (1) 
Visit_char = AnalystOnly 
Column (2) 
Visit_char = Remote 
Column (3) 
Visit_char = Unpreceded 
Visit  0.1034*** 0.0933*** 0.1093*** 
 (4.23) (4.01) (5.58) 
Visit×Visit_char (H3: +) 0.0787*** 0.0509*** 0.0318*** 
 (7.07) (9.90) (2.84) 
ΔHorizon 0.0561*** 0.0580*** 0.0591*** 
(8.01) (8.20) (8.19) 
Firmexp -0.0013 -0.0005 -0.0017 
(-0.20) (-0.07) (-0.25) 
Brokersize -0.0308 -0.0385* -0.0378* 
(-1.63) (-1.95) (-1.90) 
ANA_group 0.0115 0.0083 0.0053 
(1.22) (0.84) (0.58) 
MV -0.0277*** -0.0276*** -0.0249** 
 (-2.80) (-2.64) (-2.44) 
NI_std 0.3159*** 0.3024*** 0.2877*** 
 (5.52) (4.86) (4.82) 
Inst_holding 0.0456 0.0429 0.0464 
(1.02) (0.95) (1.02) 
Indep -0.0179 -0.0134 -0.0176 
 (-0.29) (-0.21) (-0.27) 
BM 0.1176** 0.1231** 0.1211** 
 (2.50) (2.55) (2.56) 
Growth -0.0388 -0.0377 -0.0377 
 (-1.20) (-1.11) (-1.11) 
Loss 0.2491** 0.2474** 0.2485** 
 (2.33) (2.33) (2.35) 
BHAR 0.0113 0.0108 0.0104 
 (0.86) (0.79) (0.80) 
Industry Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 13,302 13,296 13,302 
Adj. R2 0.043 0.040 0.039 
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TABLE 6 
Analysts’ site visits and the level of forecast accuracy 
 
This table presents the results from the following regression: 
 
ܣܿܿݑݎܽܿݕ௞,௝,௧ ൌ α ൅ ߚଵܸ݅ݏ݅ݐ௞,௝,௧ ൅ ߚଶܲ݋ݏݐ௞,௝,௧ ൅ ߚଷܸ݅ݏ݅ݐ௞,௝,௧ ൈ ܲ݋ݏݐ௞,௝,௧ ൅ ࢽ	࡯࢕࢔࢚࢘࢕࢒࢙ ൅ ߝ௞,௝,௧.  
 
Columns (1) and (2) report the regression results of the forecast accuracy level on the visit indicator and 
control variables before and after the site visit date, respectively. Column (3) reports the regression results 
of the forecast accuracy level on the visit indicator, the post-visit indicator, their interaction term, and the 
control variables.  
 
Accuracy is calculated as −1 times the forecast errors in the pre- (Pre_visit_AFE) or post-visit 
(Post_visit_AFE) periods. A higher value implies a higher level of forecast accuracy. The post-visit 
indicator (Post) equals 1 for post-site-visit observations and 0 otherwise. Horizon is the forecast horizon, 
calculated as the number of calendar days between the forecast issue date and corresponding earnings 
announcement date. Please see Appendix B for definitions of other variables. The full sample consists of 
26,604 observations from 2009 to 2012. The t-values in brackets are based on standard errors adjusted for 
firm and year clustering. ***, **, and * indicate that the coefficients are significant at the 0.01, 0.05, and 
0.10 levels, respectively, based on two-tailed statistical tests.  
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TABLE 6 (Cont’d) 
 
 
Column (1) 
Accuracy  
before site visit 
Column (2) 
Accuracy  
after site visit 
Column (3) 
Accuracy 
Full sample 
Visit  -0.0068 0.1056*** -0.0049 
 (-0.35) (3.07) (-0.24) 
Post   0.0451*** 
   (6.24) 
Visit×Post (H1: +)   0.1084*** 
   (5.67) 
Horizon -0.6069*** -0.5879*** -0.5974*** 
(-3.04) (-3.28) (-3.15) 
Firmexp -0.2380*** -0.2483*** -0.2433*** 
(-4.29) (-4.97) (-4.63) 
Brokersize 0.0212 -0.0187 0.0013 
(0.42) (-0.27) (0.02) 
ANA_group 0.1263*** 0.1144*** 0.1204*** 
(6.63) (6.08) (6.63) 
MV 0.1505 0.1364 0.1435 
 (1.47) (1.47) (1.47) 
NI_std -0.0016 -0.0019 -0.0018 
 (-0.94) (-1.21) (-1.07) 
Inst_holding -0.0536 -0.0462 -0.0498 
(-0.20) (-0.21) (-0.21) 
Indep -0.9623* -1.0193** -0.9907** 
 (-1.91) (-2.21) (-2.06) 
BM -1.3967*** -1.2814*** -1.3390*** 
 (-4.13) (-3.87) (-4.01) 
Growth -0.0001*** -0.0001*** -0.0001*** 
 (-3.03) (-3.33) (-3.17) 
Loss -3.6138*** -3.2916*** -3.4527*** 
 (-19.21) (-28.35) (-23.87) 
BHAR -0.0035 0.0069 0.0017 
 (-0.03) (0.07) (0.01) 
Industry Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes 
   
Observations 13,302 13,302 26,604 
Adj. R2 0.273 0.263 0.269 
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TABLE 7 
The change in forecast accuracy for visiting and nonvisiting analyst groups around site visits:  
(1) excluding nonvisiting analysts who do not conduct site visits,  
(2) excluding analysts who issued strong-buy recommendations or had investment banking 
relationships  
 
This table replicates Table 3 after imposing additional data requirements. Column (1) reports the results 
after excluding nonvisiting analysts that do not conduct site visits to the firm over the sample period. This 
additional data requirement results in a sample of 10,788 observations. Column (2) reports the results 
after excluding analysts who issued strong-buy recommendations in the year before site visits or those 
who had past investment banking relationships with the firm. This additional data requirement results in a 
sample of 9,798 observations. The regression model is: 
 
	߂ܣܿܿݑݎܽܿݕ௞,௝,௧ ൌ α ൅ ߚܸ݅ݏ݅ݐ௞,௝,௧ ൅ ߛଵ߂݄݋ݎ݅ݖ݋݊௞,௝,௧ ൅ ߛଶܨ݅ݎ݉݁ݔ݌௞,௝,௧ ൅ ߛଷܤݎ݋݇݁ݎݏ݅ݖ݁௞,௝,௧ 	
൅ ߛସܣܰܣ_݃ݎ݋ݑ݌௞,௝,௧ 	൅ ߛହܯ ௝ܸ,௧ ൅ ߛ଺ܰܫ_ݏݐ݀௝,௧ ൅ ߛ଻ܫ݊ݏݐ_݄݋݈݀݅݊݃௝,௧ ൅ ߛ଼ܫ݊݀݁݌௝,௧
൅ ߛଽܤܯ௝,௧ ൅ ߛଵ଴ܩݎ݋ݓݐ ௝݄,௧ ൅ ߛଵଵܮ݋ݏݏ௝,௧ ൅ ߛଵଶܤܪܣ ௝ܴ,௧ ൅ ܫ݊݀ݑݏݐݎݕ௝,௧ ൅ ߝ௞,௝,௧.																		 
 
The dependent variable is the forecast accuracy change for an analyst group from the pre- to post-visit 
periods (ΔAccuracy). For each site visit, there is one observation for the visiting analyst group and one 
observation for the nonvisiting analyst group. The t-values in brackets are based on standard errors 
adjusted for firm and year clustering. ***, **, and * indicate that the coefficients are significant at the 
0.01, 0.05, and 0.10 levels, respectively, based on two-tailed statistical tests. Please see Appendix B for 
variable definitions. 
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Table 7 (Cont’d) 
 
Column (1) 
Coeff. 
(t-value)
Column (2) 
Coeff. 
(t-value) 
Visit (H1: +) 0.1184*** 0.1446*** 
(6.94) (5.67) 
ΔHorizon 0.0469*** 0.0577*** 
(5.44) (5.81) 
Firmexp -0.0011 0.0013 
(-0.13) (0.32) 
Brokersize -0.0321* -0.0378* 
(-1.85) (-1.89) 
ANA_group 0.0175*** 0.0131 
(3.93) (0.91) 
MV -0.0296*** -0.0311** 
 (-3.46) (-2.28) 
NI_std 0.3579*** 0.2272*** 
 (4.53) (3.20) 
Inst_holding 0.0492 0.0530 
(1.18) (1.00) 
Indep 0.0054 -0.0665 
(0.05) (-0.74) 
BM 0.1234** 0.1401** 
 (2.00) (2.43) 
Growth -0.0222 -0.0545 
 (-0.59) (-1.27) 
Loss 0.1917*** 0.2696** 
 (12.24) (2.47) 
BHAR 0.0002 0.0140 
 (0.01) (0.71) 
Industry Fixed Effects Yes Yes 
 
Observations 10,788 9,798 
Adj. R2 0.034 0.041 
  
49 
 
 
 
TABLE 8 
 Comparisons based on the same-analyst observations 
 
This table presents the results from the following regression: 
 
ܴ݈݁_ܣܿܿݑݎܽܿݕ௜,௝,௧ ൌ α ൅ ߚܸ݅ݏ݅ݐ_ܨݎ݁ݍ௜,௝,௧ ൅ ࢽ	࡯࢕࢔࢚࢘࢕࢒࢙ ൅ ߝ௜,௝,௧.																						 
 
In Column (1), we focus on analyst-year pairs where the analyst visits some firms but not others in the 
same year. We require that the analyst issues forecasts for both types of firms. The sample consists of 
26,103 analyst-firm-year observations from 2009 to 2012. 
 
In Column (2), we focus on analyst-firm pairs, where the analyst visits the firm in some years but not in 
others. We further require that the analyst issues forecasts for the firm in both periods. The sample 
consists of 5,469 analyst-firm-year observations from 2009 to 2012. 
 
The t-values in brackets are based on standard errors adjusted for firm and year clustering. ***, **, and * 
indicate coefficients that are significant at the 0.01, 0.05, and 0.10 levels, respectively, based on two-
tailed statistical tests.  
 
Variable definitions: 
 
Rel_Accuracyi,j,t  = analyst i’s relative forecast accuracy, measured as the difference between the forecast 
error of analyst i for firm j’s year t earnings and the average forecast error across all 
analyst forecasts of firm j’s year t earnings, divided by the average absolute forecast 
error across all analyst forecasts of firm j’s year t earnings, then multiplied by −1. A 
higher value implies greater accuracy. For each analyst, we calculate the forecast error 
using the analyst’s most recent annual earnings forecast issued in the year before the 
firm’s earnings announcement. 
Visit_freqi,j,t  = site visit frequency, measured as the number of site visits conducted by analyst i in 
the six-month period before the issue date of the most recent earnings forecast used to 
calculate the analyst’s forecast accuracy or the period between the last year’s earnings 
announcement date and the issue date of the most recent earnings forecast, whichever is 
longer. Visit_freq equals 2 (1, 0) if analyst i visited firm j two or more (once, zero) 
times during this period. 
Horizoni,j,t  = forecast horizon, calculated as the number of calendar days between the forecast 
issue date and corresponding earnings announcement dates. 
Firmexpi,j,t  = analyst’s firm-specific experience, calculated as the log transformation of the interval 
in years between analyst i’s first forecast for firm j and his/her forecast at time t for 
firm j. 
Genexpi,t  = analyst’s general experience, calculated as the log transformation of the interval in 
years between analyst i’s first forecast in the CSMAR database and his/her current 
forecast at time t. 
Brokersizei,t  = brokerage size, calculated as the number of analysts working for the brokerage with 
which analyst i is associated. 
Numindi,t  = industry coverage, calculated as the log transformation of the number of CSRC 
Level-2 industries analyst i covers. 
MVj,t  = firm size, calculated as the log transformation of the market value of equity of firm j 
at the end of last fiscal year. 
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TABLE 8 (Cont’d) 
 
 
Column (1) 
Coeff. 
(t-value) 
Column (2) 
Coeff. 
(t-value) 
Visit_freq_  0.0462*** 0.0413*** 
 (10.63) (4.36) 
Horizon -0.2819*** -0.2608*** 
(-5.74) (-4.31) 
Firmexp 0.1152*** 0.0642 
(6.30) (1.55) 
Genexp 0.0138 -0.0109 
(1.06) (-0.75) 
Brokersize 0.0158 0.0065 
(0.93) (0.21) 
Numind -0.0282 -0.0077 
(-0.71) (-0.22) 
MV 0.0102* 0.0010 
 (1.74) (0.07) 
Industry Fixed Effects Yes Yes 
Observations 26,103 5,469 
Adj. R2 0.090 0.083 
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TABLE 9 
Site visits and market reaction 
 
This table presents the results from the following regression: 
 
ܥܣܴ௜,௝,௧ ൌ α ൅ ߚଵܧܨ_ܴ݁ݒ௜,௝,௧ ൅ ߚଶܸ݅ݏ݅ݐ_݌ݎ݁ݒ_݉݋݊ݐ݄௜,௝,௧ ൅ ߚଷܧܨ_ܴ݁ݒ௜,௝,௧ ൈ ܸ݅ݏ݅ݐ_݌ݎ݁ݒ_݉݋݊ݐ݄௜,௝,௧ ൅
ᅷܥ݋݊ݐݎ݋݈ݏ ൅ ߝ௞,௝,௧. 
 
The full sample consists of 17,317 earnings forecast revisions issued between 2009 and 2012. We require 
the sample firms to have at least one earnings forecast revision with Visit_ prev_month = 1 and at least 
one earnings forecast revision with Visit_ prev_month = 0. The t-values in brackets are based on standard 
errors adjusted for firm and year clustering. ***, **, and * indicate coefficients that are significant at the 
0.01, 0.05, and 0.10 levels, respectively, based on two-tailed statistical tests.  
 
Variable definitions: 
 
CARi,j,t  = cumulative abnormal returns in the (−1, +1) window around the earnings forecast 
revision. The daily abnormal return is calculated as the firm’s return on day t minus 
the daily return of a benchmark portfolio with the same size decile as the firm. 
EF_Revi,j,t  = analyst forecast revision, calculated as the difference between the analyst’s current 
annual earnings forecast and the same analyst’s prior forecast, scaled by the stock 
price at the end of the month before the revision. 
Visit_prev_monthi,j,t  = indicator variable for site visit. It equals 1 if analyst i visits firm j during the 
month before the current earnings forecast and 0 otherwise. 
Revenue_Forecasti,j,t  = indicator variable for revenue forecast. It equals 1 if the earnings forecast is 
accompanied by a revenue forecast and 0 otherwise. 
Horizoni,j,t  = forecast horizon, calculated as the number of calendar days between the forecast 
issue date and the subsequent earnings announcement date. 
Numcomi,t  = firm coverage, calculated as the log transformation of the number of firms covered 
by analyst i. 
Numindi,t  = industry coverage, calculated as the log transformation of the number of CSRC 
Level-2 industries covered by analyst i. 
Brokersizei,t  = brokerage size, calculated as the number of analysts working for the brokerage 
with which analyst i is associated. 
Stari,t  = indicator variable for star analysts. 
Genexpi,t  = analyst’s general experience, calculated as the log transformation of the interval in 
years between analyst i’s first forecast in the CSMAR database and his/her current 
forecast at time t. 
FEi,j,t,  = forecast error, calculated as the absolute value of the difference between the actual 
earnings and analyst i’s forecast, scaled by the firm’s stock price in the last year. 
MVj,t  = firm size, calculated as the log transformation of the market value of equity of 
firm j at the end of the last fiscal year. 
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TABLE 9 (Cont’d) 
 
 Coeff. (t-value) 
EF_Rev 0.2537*** 
 (6.26) 
EF_Rev× Visit_prev_month 0.0448** 
 (2.35) 
Visit_ prev_month 0.0031*** 
 (3.54) 
Revenue_Forecast -0.0022 
 (-1.07) 
Horizon -0.0003** 
 (-2.19) 
Numcom -0.0015 
 (-1.42) 
Numind 0.0019 
 (0.97) 
Brokersize -0.0003 
(-0.24) 
Star 0.0040*** 
(2.91) 
Genexp -0.0003 
(-0.36) 
FE 0.2117*** 
 (8.29) 
MV -0.0003 
 (-0.63) 
Industry Fixed Effects Yes 
 
Observations 17,317 
Adj. R2 0.021 
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TABLE 10 
Site visits and local advantage 
 
This table presents the results from the following regression: 
 
ܴ݈݁_ܣܿܿݑݎܽܿݕ௜,௝,௧
ൌ α ൅ ߚଵܰ݋݊_݈݋݈ܿܽ௜,௝,௧ ൅ ߚଶܸ݅ݏ݅ݐ_ܨݎ݁ݍ௜,௝,௧ ൅ ߚଷܰ݋݊_݈݋݈ܿܽ௜,௝,௧ ൈ ܸ݅ݏ݅ݐ_ܨݎ݁ݍ௜,௝,௧
൅ ࢽ	࡯࢕࢔࢚࢘࢕࢒࢙ ൅ ߝ௜,௝,௧.													 
 
The full sample consists of 17,714 analyst forecasts issued from 2009 to 2012. As in Bae et al. (2008), the 
control variables are demeaned by firm-year averages. The t-values in brackets are based on standard 
errors adjusted for firm and year clustering. ***, **, and * indicate coefficients that are significant at the 
0.01, 0.05, and 0.10 levels, respectively, based on two-tailed statistical tests.  
 
Variable definitions: 
Rel_Accuracyi,j,t  = analyst i’s relative forecast accuracy, measured as the difference between the forecast 
error of analyst i for firm j’s year t earnings and the average forecast error across all 
analyst forecasts of firm j’s year t earnings, divided by the average absolute forecast 
error across all analyst forecasts of firm j’s year t earnings, then multiplied by −1. A 
higher value implies greater accuracy. For each analyst, we calculate the forecast error 
by using this analyst’s most recent annual earnings forecast issued in the year before 
the firm’s earnings announcement. 
Non_locali,j,t  = indicator variable for nonlocal analysts. It equals 1 for analyst i whose brokerage is 
more than 400 kilometers (250 miles) away from the headquarters of firm j and 0 
otherwise. 
Visit_freqi,j,t  = site visit frequency, measured as the number of site visits conducted by analyst i in 
the six-month period before the issue date of the current earnings forecast used to 
calculate the analyst’s forecast accuracy or the period between last year’s earnings 
announcement date and the current earnings forecast issue date, whichever is longer. 
Visit_freq equals 2 (1, 0) if analyst i visited firm j two or more (once, zero) times 
during this period. 
Horizoni,j,t  = forecast horizon, calculated as the number of calendar days between the forecast 
issue date and corresponding earnings announcement dates. 
Firmexpi,j,t  = analyst’s firm-specific experience, calculated as the log transformation of the interval 
in years between analyst i’s first forecast for firm j and his/her forecast at time t for 
firm j. 
Genexpi,t  = analyst’s general experience, calculated as the log transformation of the interval in 
years between analyst i’s first forecast in the CSMAR database and his/her current 
forecast at time t. 
Brokersizei,t  = brokerage size, calculated as the number of analysts working for the brokerage with 
which analyst i is associated. 
Numindi,t  = industry coverage, calculated as the log transformation of the number of CSRC 
Level-2 industries analyst i covers. 
MVj,t  = firm size, calculated as the log transformation of the market value of equity of firm j 
at the end of last fiscal year. 
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TABLE 10 (Cont’d) 
 
 
Column (1) 
Coeff. 
(t-value)
Column (2) 
Coeff. 
(t-value)
Column (3) 
Coeff. 
(t-value)
Column (4) 
Coeff. 
(t-value)
 
Non_local -0.0190***  -0.0168** -0.0300***  
 (-2.86)  (-2.39) (-3.96)  
Visit_freq  0.0364*** 0.0359*** 0.0108***  
  (8.15) (7.99) (2.96)  
Non_local×Visit_freq    0.0364***  
    (5.24)  
Horizon -0.2734*** -0.2711*** -0.2711*** -0.2711***  
(-6.80) (-6.71) (-6.72) (-6.71)  
Firmexp 0.1450*** 0.1429*** 0.1424*** 0.1424***  
(5.37) (5.50) (5.42) (5.44)  
Genexp 0.0147 0.0157 0.0152 0.0151  
(1.08) (1.14) (1.12) (1.12)  
Brokersize 0.0195 0.0161 0.0161 0.0158  
(0.73) (0.60) (0.60) (0.59)  
Numind  -0.0365 -0.0368 -0.0361 -0.0357  
 (-1.20) (-1.20) (-1.18) (-1.18)  
MV 0.0096*** 0.0093*** 0.0098*** 0.0097***  
 (4.02) (2.84) (2.94) (2.83)  
Industry Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes  
     
Observations 17,714 17,714 17,714 17,714  
Adj. R2 0.083 0.084 0.084 0.084  
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TABLE 11 
Determinants of analyst site visits 
 
This table reports the results from the following regression: 
 
ܸ݅ݏ݅ݐ_݂݅ݎ݉௜,௝,௧ ൌ α ൅ ߚଵܦ݅ݏݐܽ݊ܿ݁௜,௝,௧ିଵ ൅ ߚଶܤݎ݋݇݁ݎݏ݅ݖ ௜݁,௧ିଵ൅ߚଷܯܽ݊ݑ݂ܽܿݐݑݎ݁௝,௧ିଵ ൅ ߚସܾ݈ܶܽ݊݃݅݅݅ݐݕ௝,௧ିଵ ൅
ߚହܥ݋݊ܿ݁݊ݐݎܽݐ݅݋ ௝݊,௧ିଵ ൅ ߚ଺ܵݐݎ݋݊݃ܤݑݕ௜,௝,௧ିଵ ൅ ߚ଻ܦ݅ݏ݈ܿ݋ݏݑݎ݁_ݎܽݐ݅݊݃௝,௧ିଵ ൅ ߚ଼ܣܰܣ௝,௧ିଵ ൅ ߚଽܱܵܧ௝,௧ିଵ ൅
ߚଵ଴ܯ ௝ܸ,௧ିଵ ൅ ߚଵଵܴܱܣ௝,௧ିଵ ൅ ߚଵଶܣ݃݁௝,௧ିଵ ൅ ߚଵଷܤܯ௝,௧ିଵ ൅ ߚଵସܦܾ݁ݐ௝,௧ିଵ ൅ ߝ௞,௝,௧. 
 
The full sample consists of 49,553 analyst-firm-year observations in the period of 2009 to 2012. The z-
values are reported in parentheses and are based on standard errors adjusted for firm clustering. ***, **, * 
indicate the coefficients that are significant at the 0.01, 0.05, and 0.10 levels, respectively, based on two-
tailed statistical tests.  
 
Please see Appendix B for the measurements of Manufacture, Tangibility, Concentration, MV, and BM, 
except that they are measured in year t−1. The measurements of other variables are as follows. 
 
Visit_firmi,j,t = Indicator for site visit, 1 if analyst i visits firm j at least once in year t and 
0 otherwise.  
Distancei,j,t-1 = The natural logarithm of the geographical distances (in kilometers) 
between analyst i and the visited firm j’s headquarters. 
Brokersizei,t-1 = Brokerage size, defined as the natural logarithm of the number of 
analysts working for the brokerage. 
StrongBuy i,j,t-1 = An indicator variable that equals 1 when analyst i issue at least one 
strong-buy recommendation for firm j in year t−1. 
Disclosure_rating j,t-1 = Indicator for high disclosure rating, based on the rating of information 
disclosure quality assigned by the Shenzhen Stock Exchange to the listed 
companies, with four categories, A, B, C, and D. The indicator variable 
is equal to 1 if the disclosure rating for firm j in year t−1 is A or B and 0 
otherwise. 
ANA j,t-1 = Analyst coverage, measured as the natural logarithm of one plus the total 
number of analysts issuing earnings forecasts in year t−1. 
SOE j,t-1 = Indicator variable for SEO firms: 1 if firm j is a state-owned enterprise in 
year t−1 and 0 otherwise. 
ROA j,t-1 = Return of assets, calculated as the net income divided by total assets of 
firm j in year t−1.  
Age j,t-1 = Firm age, measured as the natural logarithm of 1 plus the number of 
years the company has been listed up to the end of fiscal year t−1. 
Debt j,t-1 = The ratio of total debt divided by total assets in year t−1. 
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TABLE 11 (Cont’d) 
 
 
Coeff. 
(z-value) 
Variables related to the cost of conducting site visits  
Distance -0.1028*** 
(-7.84) 
Brokersize 0.5847*** 
 (5.38) 
Variables related to the benefit of conducting site visits  
Manufacture 0.0715 
(1.64) 
Tangibility 0.0770*** 
(2.77) 
Concentration 0.0576*** 
(2.84) 
 
Control variables  
StrongBuy 0.1328* 
 (1.87) 
Disclosure_rating 0.1664*** 
(4.38) 
ANA 0.1809*** 
(9.77) 
SOE -0.2576*** 
(-6.79) 
MV 0.0059 
(0.20) 
ROA -0.3379 
(-1.15) 
Age 0.0423*** 
(7.74) 
BM 0.1069 
(1.43) 
Debt 0.0108 
 (0.11) 
Industry Fixed Effects Yes 
  
Observations 49,553 
Pesudo-R2 0.0434 
 
 
